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I. INTRODUCTION
Most who have looked at the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
in election disputes have concluded that ADR is not appropriate in the
election context, particularly in post-election disputes. This article challenges
that orthodoxy and suggests that ADR, specifically mediation, can play a
useful role when elections go awry.
As someone who teaches both ADR and Election Law, I like to point out
to my students the natural link between these two disciplines-elections,
after all, are a form of dispute resolution. So it seems almost cannibalistic to
ask the question of how ADR might inform election law. Not only that, but
as discussed in different ways at the Symposium underlying this volume,
election disputes do not fit well with many of the theories that animate ADR
scholarship. Elections are inherently binary. Elections are the zero-sum game
that any admirer of Getting to Yes' abhors. In an election, there is no way to
split the pie any differently, no way to "create value." 2 Democracy demands
a winner and a loser. There is nothing in elections Beyond Winning.3
This article explores what the ADR field can contribute to resolving
disputes in elections based on the premise that although elections themselves
are binary, the many disputes that can arise during the election process reveal
a more nuanced picture. Disaggregating election disputes reveals structures
* Professor of Practice, William & Mary Law School. Many thanks to the following
individuals for their valuable insights and input: Minnesota Secretary of State Mark
Ritchie, Minnesota Supreme Court Justice Paul Anderson, Jack Young, Marc Elias, Ben
Ginsberg, Gary Poser, and Lynn Fraser. Thanks also to Carrie Menkel-Meadow and
Howard Bellman for their suggestions and encouragement. And finally, thanks to John
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1 ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce ed., 1991).
2 Although some have suggested there are ways to split the pie even in elections. See
Lawrence Susskind, Could Florida Election Dispute Have Been Mediated?, DISP. RESOL.
MAG., Winter 2002, at 8, 10 (including the bold idea that Gore and Bush, through a
mediated agreement, might have (1) agreed to give the other input in Supreme Court
appointments, cabinet posts, and (2) agreed to install bipartisan task forces to develop
proposals on key policy issues).
3 ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE
IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000).
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that ADR scholars and practitioners deal with every day: multiple parties of
interest, strong fervor, high emotion, a focus on positions rather than
interests, and a need to define a process that will produce a result that all
sides will abide.
By disaggregating disputes that arise in elections, I hope to show that
there is room for value creation in election dispute resolution and that
mediation can help resolve election disputes more efficiently. Others have
written about mediating disputes that arise before elections, 4 but common
wisdom has advised that "parties are unlikely to . . . resolve post-election
disputes in mediation in light of the high stakes finger-pointing and the need
to certify the election results in a timely manner." 5 This article takes issue
with that assumption, arguing that mediation could prove a useful tool to
address shortfalls inherent in post-election litigation.
This paper begins with a review of the current landscape with respect to
non-judicial resolution of election disputes, underscoring general acceptance
of the idea that court is not always the best place to resolve certain election
disputes. The following sections review the drawbacks of both mediation and
litigation in the post-election dispute context, concluding that both are in
their own ways fraught. With these shortcomings in mind, the next section
suggests that disaggregating post-election disputes into process disputes
versus outcome-determinative disputes reveals a role for mediation. The final
section tests this approach using the 2008 Minnesota senate recount as a case
study. The Minnesota recount provides an opportunity to retroactively
disaggregate post-election disputes, illustrating some of the greatest-and
perhaps most unanticipated-challenges posed. Although mediation might
not be right in all post-election disputes, the Minnesota example helps
unpack instances in which mediation could usefully play a part.
II. EXTRA-JUDICIAL PROCESSES IN ELECTION DISPUTES
Before advancing the theory that ADR, particularly mediation, could
improve dispute outcomes in the election context, this section reveals that
many jurisdictions already employ extra-judicial forms of dispute resolution
in U.S. elections. Out-of-court election dispute resolution mechanisms are in
place at both the federal and state level. This section will discuss four distinct
forms: statutory, administrative, legislative, and quasi-judicial.
4 See generally Erin Butcher-Lyden, Note, The Need for Mandatory Mediation and
Arbitration in Election Disputes, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 531 (2010) (arguing for
the adoption of a federal statute mandating mediation in pre-election disputes).
5 Id. at 544.
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ADR is featured explicitly in several state and federal statutes.6 One
example is the Federal Election Commission (FEC) ADR Program.7 In 2000,
the FEC established the program, which employs ADR techniques to resolve
selected federal campaign finance disclosure disputes. While the FEC's ADR
Program has never formally mediated a case, the program uses problem
solving facilitative mediation techniques to settle select campaign finance
complaints. According to program director Lynn Fraser, the use of interest-
based negotiation has greatly enhanced the efficiency with which such
referrals are processed.8
The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) provides another example of an
explicit statutory ADR requirement in elections. To be eligible for funding
under HAVA, section 15512 requires states to incorporate ADR procedures
to help individuals resolve specified claims involving discrimination or lack
of access to the polls should the administrative complaint process take too
long. 9 Following HAVA's mandate, states have begun to adopt ADR
procedures. For example, New York's Election Law section 3-105 sets out an
administrative complaint procedure that provides a process for recourse for
an individual who believes that there has been a violation of Title III of
HAVA.10 The New York statute provides that if a panel of the State Board of
Elections fails to resolve a formal complaint within ninety days, the
6 For a review of some examples, see Butcher-Lyden, supra note 4, at 571-72.
7 See ADR Program, FEC, http://www.fec.gov/em/adr.shtml (revised Feb. 2010).
This program tracks general federal support for the increased use of ADR, embodied in
the enactment of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. § 574(a),
(b) (LexisNexis 2011) (authorizing federal agencies to use ADR in disputes, exempting
mediation from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, and requiring agencies
to adopt ADR policies) and the ADR Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 651 (requiring each
federal district court to develop ADR procedures).
8 Telephone Interview with Lynn Fraser, Director, Federal Election Commission
ADR Program (May 25, 2011). For a discussion of the politics surrounding the passage
of the ADRA, see Lawrence E. Susskind et al., When ADR Becomes the Law: A Review
of Federal Practice, 9 NEGOTIATION J. 59 (1993). Since its passage, federal agencies
have increasingly incorporated ADR dispute resolution techniques to curtail litigation and
other administrative inefficiencies. See David Seibel, To Enhance the Operation of
Government: Reauthorizing the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 1 HARv. NEGOT.
L. REV. 239 (1996).
9 See 42 U.S.C. §15512(a)(2)(I) ("If the State fails to meet the deadline applicable
under subparagraph (H), the complaint shall be resolved within 60 days under ADR
procedures established for purposes of this section. The record and other materials from
any proceedings conducted under the complaint procedures established under this section
shall be made available for use under the ADR procedures." (emphasis added)).
10 N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 3-105(1) (Consol. 2011).
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complaint can be moved to an outside ADR agency for resolution.11 The
agency then has an additional sixty days to resolve the dispute and make a
final determination.' 2 New York contracts with the New York State Dispute
Resolution Association to resolve these complaints.' 3 While the system is in
place, thus far no claim has been resolved through this mechanism. 14
Although neither example reflects a robust incorporation of ADR into
election processes, the FEC ADR Program and HAVA's ADR mandates
mark federal recognition that ADR has a place in resolving election disputes.
Aside from explicit statutory mention of ADR in resolving election
disputes, the most common form of non-judicial resolution of election
disputes is administrative. Connecticut provides an example of a state that
routes election disputes through an administrative commission before
proceeding to court.' 5  Connecticut's State Elections Enforcement
Commission is charged with policing "[any] alleged violation . . . of any
provision of the general statutes relating to any election or referendum [or]
primary ... ."l6 In a nod to informal dispute resolution measures, Connecticut
statute requires that the Commission "attempt to secure voluntary
compliance, by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion,
with [the requirements of Connecticut election statutes]."' 7 Another example
is North Carolina, where election statutes require that those who wish to file
an "election protest" must file with the county board of elections for
preliminary consideration, with an appeal to the state board of elections.' 8
Many other states require an administrative process before a party may
I1 N.Y. ELEC. LAw § 3-105(7) (Consol. 2011).
12 Id
13 According to Bill McCann, Deputy Enforcement Counsel for the New York State
Board of Elections, very few HAVA complaints reach the state level each year. McCann
stated that the majority of complaints are resolved on the local level.
14 Since the Election Law §3-105 was enacted, the ADR provision has never been
used. McCann says that the Legislature enacted the law to provide the Board of Elections
with more control and flexibility to resolve disputes and address complaints (e.g., by
providing more access to the polls), but the administrative process has not yet progressed
to the point where the provision is necessary. McCann noted that this provision is not
particularly useful in avoiding litigation because it addresses HAVA complaints
specifically; HAVA provides no right to sue in itself. New York does not have an ADR
provision for any other election law complaint process. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 3 -105
(Consol. 2011).
15 CoNN. GEN. STAT.§ 9-7a(g) (2011).
16 CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 9-7b(a)(1) (2011).
17 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-7b(a)(6) (2011).
18 N.C. GEN. STAT. §163-182.9-11 (2011).
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litigate a post-election dispute. 19 Election law scholars analyzing the
effectiveness of administrative remedies point to partisanship of election
administration in most states negatively impacting the integrity of and
public's confidence in elections as serious challenges these bodies face. 20
No doubt in homage to the idea that courts should steer clear of political
disputes, 21 some state statutes require state legislatures to settle certain post-
election disputes. Legislative branch involvement is typically restricted to
elections for specified offices of distinct importance, such as governor. 22
Akin to the power conferred on Congress by Article 1, Section 5 of the U.S.
Constitution, which grants to Congress the power to judge the elections and
qualifications of its members, some states similarly grant power to state
legislatures to resolve certain election disputes. Alabama statute, for
example, mandates that its general assembly serves as a tribunal to resolve
disputes in elections for a wide range of offices. 23 Likewise, Colorado state
statutes charge its general assembly with resolving contests concerning
elections of certain state officers. 24
Of states that rely on the judiciary to resolve election disputes, some
have established alternative quasi-adjudicative procedures for certain election
disputes. In Illinois, for example, all election disputes are fast-tracked
19 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-7-5(a)(1 1) (2011).
20 Daniel P. Tokaji, The Persistence of Partisan Election Administration, ELECTION
LAW @ MORITZ (Sept. 28, 2010),
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/index.php?ID=7645.
21 See infra notes 65-69.
22 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120.205 (LexisNexis 2011); 25 P.A. STAT. ANN. § 3312
(West 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-1-50 (2011); V.A. CODE ANN. § 24.03-804 (2011); W.
VA. CODE § 3-7-2 (LexisNexis 2011).
23 ALA. CODE § 17-16-65 (2011). "The two houses of the Legislature, in joint
convention assembled, and presided over by the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
shall constitute the tribunal for the trial of all contests for the office of Governor,
Secretary of State, Auditor, Treasurer, Attorney General, Commissioner of Agriculture
and Industries, justices of the Supreme Court, or judges of the courts of appeals . . . ."
24 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN §§1-11-205, 207 (West 2011). Colorado's statutory
scheme instructs that the senate president will preside over a meeting of the general
assembly at which testimony from the contestor will be heard, along with the contestee.
The parties' lawyers may then offer arguments, followed by debate among the general
assembly concluding with a vote. Steven Huefner observes that "letting majoritarian
institutions resolve questions about the majority's will in an election contest may be
appropriate." Steven F. Huefner, Remedying Election Wrongs, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
265, 321 (2007). For an argument advocating against state courts interfering with
Congress' role in U.S. Congressional clections, see Kristen R. Lisk, The Resolution of
Contested Elections in the U.S. House of Representatives: Why State Courts Should Not
Help with the House Work, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1213 (2008).
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directly to the State Supreme Court.25 In Nebraska, one district court is
designated to hear all election disputes. 26 In Ohio, contests involving races
for statewide office are heard by the Chief Justice of the State Supreme
Court.27 Some states make use of judicial panels, perhaps demonstrating a
recognition that election disputes are both too important and too political to
be entrusted to one judge. In Iowa, the Chief Justice of the Iowa State
Supreme Court selects three district judges to make up a panel to hear
disputes in statewide elections, and selects four district judges to sit with him
or her to hear disputes regarding elections for national office, including
presidential electors. 28 For ballot initiatives, Iowa's resolution-by-panel-
system ventures even further from standard judicial resolution: the contesting
party nominates one panelist, the county commissioner nominates an
opposing panelist, and the two nominated panelists mutually agree on a third
person, all three of whom sit together to adjudicate the dispute.29
The range of alternatives to standard litigation indicates dissatisfaction
among the states with traditional adjudication as the sole method of resolving
election disputes. By allowing county and state administrative boards to
resolve local election disputes, holding special legislative sessions, or
convening special judicial panels, states routinely acknowledge that some
election disputes are ill-suited, for a variety of reasons, to standard litigation.
While litigation remains a default solution, states appear open to exploring
alternative methods to reach more efficient and satisfying results.
Although there has been increasing interest in the use of ADR in election
disputes, mediation has not been promoted in the post-election context. The
next section examines likely reasons why.
III. THE DRAWBACKS OF MEDIATION
IN THE POST-ELECTION CONTEXT
Good mediators work with parties to help them understand their interests
and generate options to meet those interests. A skilled mediator can help
parties identify their interests even if they came to the table armed only with
25 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/23-1.la (LexisNexis 2011) ("[t]he Supreme Court
shall have jurisdiction over contests of the results of any election, including a primary, for
an elected officer provided for in Article V of the Constitution, and shall retain
jurisdiction throughout the course of such election contests.").
26 NEB. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 32-1102 (LexisNexis 2011).
27 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 35.1508(B) (LexisNexis 2011).
28 IOWA CODE § 61.1, 60.1 (LexisNexis 2011).
29 IOWA CODE § 57.1 (LexisNexis 2011).
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intractable "positions." 30 Once a full set of interests is on the table, the move
to helping parties generate value-creating options is the mediator's bread and
butter. But, as noted at the outset, critics of mediation in election disputes
point to the problem that elections are a zero-sum game. How can you create
value when the whole point of an election is to pick a winner?
The drawbacks to using mediation in this context are not limited to this
puzzle. Some of mediation's biggest advantages in other contexts are
problematic when applied to election disputes. The principle of
confidentiality provides a perfect example. For those of us who have tried to
explain the value of mediation to disputing parties, one of the biggest selling
points is confidentiality. 31 Virtually any litigant can see value in the prospect
of avoiding airing dirty laundry in court by privately sitting down with a
mediator to resolve the terms of the dispute. It is well recognized, however,
that for certain kinds of disputes shutting out the public eye can be quite
problematic.
For example, Rojas v. Superior Court32 involved a complaint that owners
of an apartment building concealed the building's toxic mold problem. The
tenants sued to compel production of material from an earlier mediation
between the owners and developers, who both saw it in their best interest to
keep the existence of a toxic mold problem from the tenants. The lower court
constructed an exception to mediation confidentiality to allow plaintiffs
access to the mediation documents. The California Supreme Court reversed,
finding confidentiality in mediation communications absolute as it applies to
30 FISHER & URY, supra note 1, at 42. The authors lay out the difference between
"positions" and "interests" by observing that "behind opposed positions lie shared and
compatible interests . . . ." Id. The work of the mediator is to identify those interests and
to help the parties create options that satisfy those shared interests. Earlier, Mary Parker
Follett described the difference usefully:
In the Harvard Library one day ... someone wanted the window open, I wanted it
shut. We opened the window in the next room, where no one was sitting. This was
not a compromise because there was no curtailing of desire; we both got what we
really wanted. For I did not want a closed room, I simply did not want the north
wind to blow directly on me; likewise the other occupant did not want that particular
window open, he merely wanted more air in the room.
Mary Parker Follett, Constructive Conflict, in PROPHET OF MANAGEMENT: A
CELEBRATION OF WRITINGS FROM THE 1920s 67, 69 (Pauline Graham ed., 1995).
31 See JoHN W. COOLEY, THE MEDIATOR'S HANDBOOK 6 (2d ed. 2006) (listing
nonpublic nature as the first in a list of the benefits of mediation).
32 Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260 (Cal. 2004).
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evidence prepared for the sole and limited purpose of mediation. 33
Confidentiality in election dispute mediation is similarly fraught. Should
election dispute mediations be conducted behind closed doors? Unlike
disputes between private parties, the public might demand to know-and
indeed has the right to know-how election disputes are resolved for the very
reason that it is the public which must sanction the outcome. Secrecy, even a
hint of the proverbial smoke-filled room-can cast great doubt on the
legitimacy of an electoral outcome. 34
Another reason parties are encouraged to try mediation is self-
determination. Self-determination is often cited as the predominant benefit of
and central value in mediation because it ensures that outcomes are
responsive to the parties' interests. 35 There is no way to know how a judge
will decide a case, but mediation affords parties the opportunity to control the
outcome of their dispute.36 This quality can be very attractive to parties,
33 Id. at 271. See generally Sarah Williams, Confidentiality in Mediation: Is It
Encouraging Good Mediation or Bad Conduct? Rojas v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, 2005 J. Disp. RESOL. 209 (2005). For an interesting discussion of how the
Uniform Mediation Act's confidentiality provisions managed the problem of public
health and safety versus confidentiality, see Philip J. Harter, The Uniform Mediation Act:
An Essential Framework for Self-Determination, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 251, 258 (2002)
("[What ifJ the mediator ... learn(s] that a barrel of a highly toxic chemical lies just
beneath the local playground or that some product poses a very real danger to potential
users[?] Or, it may be that one of the participants is so upset with what happened that s/he
plans to seriously harm someone. In these instances the strong presumption of
confidentiality-which is essential for mediation to work successfully-should be
overridden and the facts revealed, but only to the extent necessary to address the concern.
The question is: who decides and by what standards."(citation omitted)).
34 One way around mediation confidentiality issues is to make election mediation
sessions open to the public. See Uniform Mediation Act, 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/1
§ 6(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2011). Indeed, in some instances a state's open meetings laws
might require access. But this option risks forfeiting the significant benefits
confidentiality lends to mediation, including encouraging candor and uninhibited option
generation.
35 Kimberlee Kovach, "Mediation," THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 305
(Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone, eds., 2005).
36 See, e.g., Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Self-Determination in International Mediation:
Some Preliminary Reflections, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 277, 277 (2006) (noting
that "the right of self-determination allows parties to participate in decisionmaking and
voluntarily determine the outcome of their disputes. This understanding of self-
determination is rooted in the philosophical principle of personal autonomy and is
expressed through the legal doctrine of informed consent. The simple version of the
normative story states that those who are affected by a dispute should voluntarily consent
to the outcome of that dispute. In short, "party" self-determination in mediation gives
ownership of the conflict to the disputants.").
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particularly in cases in which it is difficult to predict the litigated outcome.
But self-determination is a tricky concept in election disputes (and indeed in
any mediated public dispute). Who is the "self' being determined in an
election dispute? Is it the candidate? The party? The national party? The state
party? The candidate's supporters? 37 The whole project of democracy is a
form of self-determination: the right of the electorate to determine their
representatives. Self-determination is quite difficult in the election context. 38
An intimately related challenge to be explored in greater detail below
involves the scope of parties' authority to settle an election dispute. Suppose
in a recount contest the two parties agree in mediation that a new election
should be administered. Do the parties have the power to mandate this
remedy through a mediated agreement? In certain instances when courts have
ordered new elections they have undertaken to impose this remedy under
dubious statutory authority. 39 What exactly is the scope of parties' authority
to settle post-election disputes? Mediated agreements have the force of a
contract, but can a court enforce such an agreement?40
An additional hurdle to using mediation in election disputes is the
problem of choosing a mediator. Is it possible to find a truly "neutral" person
in the heat of a political battle?41 Professor Edward Foley's elaborate scheme
37 For an interesting discussion of stakeholders in election disputes, see David
Kovick & John Hardin Young, ADR Mechanisms, in GUIDELINES FOR UNDERSTANDING,
ADJUDICATING, AND RESOLVING DISPUTES IN ELECTIONS 227, 245-246 (Chad Vickery
ed., 2011), available at
http://www.ifes.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Books/201 1/GUARDE-final_publication.
pdf.
38 Note that the problem of self-determination is inherent in many if not most public
disputes because by definition, a public dispute has an impact on and involves a diverse
array of parties in interest. See SUSAN L. CARPENTER & W.J.D. KENNEDY, MANAGING
PUBLIC DISPUTES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HANDLING CONFLICT AND REACHING
AGREEMENTS 5 (1988).
39 Huefner, supra note 24, at n. 112 (See, e.g., Gunaji v. Macias, 31 P.3d 1008, 1012,
1016-18 (N.M. 2001) (creating an equitable remedy of partial revote, in contrast to code
requirement of disregarding the entire precinct); State ex rel. Olson v. Bakken, 329
N.W.2d 575, 579-82 (N.D. 1983) (approving the equitable remedy of partial special
election for an identified set of voters whose votes were not counted).
40 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995) (discussing
the need for "public adjudication" versus what the parties may themselves desire).
41 The mediator choice problem goes beyond the neutrality problem. In advocating
for mediation, this article assumes that mediation will be done well, by a skilled mediator
able to help the parties realize mediation's many benefits. As longtime public dispute
mediator Howard Bellman points out, however, "even with surgery, you cannot always
assume it will be done well." This mediator competency problem should be
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for empaneling an election tribunal to resolve contested elections provides an
example of just how difficult a task it is to find people who the public will
accept as truly neutral in a contested election.42 Even if mediation did have
some use in election disputes, would the idea be dead on arrival given the
difficulty of identifying a true neutral?43
The mediator choice problem leads to another of the biggest challenges
mediating election disputes: finality. There is no guarantee in mediation that
the parties will emerge with an agreement. When agreement is not reached,
mediators take solace in the belief that mediation has at least facilitated
communication and understanding between the parties.44 From this
perspective, failure to reach a settlement is not a failure on the part of the
mediator if the parties walk away with a better understanding of the other
side's interests and their own. But some disagreements simply require
finality; election disputes fall in this category, particularly given the time-
sensitivity inherent in all post-election disputes. Someone must take office.
This leads to a further difficulty. Mediation is often seen as the best
alternative in disputes that involve ongoing relationships. 45 Elections,
acknowledged as a potential drawback of mediating election disputes. Telephone
Interview with Howard Bellman, Mediator/Arbitrator, August 15, 2011.
42 Edward B, Foley, The Analysis and Mitigation of Electoral Errors: Theory,
Practice, Policy, 18 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 350, 378-79 (2007) ("Consider a five-
member court that convenes only when an election contest is filed. Its members
consist of four judges who already sit on other general-jurisdiction state courts.
These four members are selected, one each, by the majority and minority leaders of
both houses of the state legislature. These selections occur at set intervals, so that
these members of the court are known in advance of any election contest that may
occur. The fifth member is an attorney, whether a currently sitting judge or not,
chosen by the mutual agreement of the other four members. This fifth member also
serves for a specified term, with a new fifth member chosen by the other four current
members, when the previous fifth member's term has expired. In this way, also, the
fifth member is always specified before an election contest arises.").
43 Election Attorney Ben Ginsberg sees neutrality as the single biggest impediment
to mediating election disputes. Telephone Interview with Ben Ginsberg, Partner, Patton
Boggs LLP (June 2, 2011).
44 Some mediators feel that their job is not even aimed at achieving a finalized
agreement. "Transformative" mediators, for example, do not view "problem solving" as
the goal. Instead, they see party empowerment, communication, and recognition as the
object of the mediation exercise. See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER,
THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND
RECOGNITION 108-12 (1994).
45 Frank E. A. Sander & Lukasz Rozdeiczer, Matching Cases and Dispute
Resolution Procedures: Detailed Analysis Leading to a Mediation-Centered Approach,
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however, are not about preserving relationships between the two sides.
Enhancing "understanding" between the parties is not relevant or useful in
the context of election disputes. Chances are good that. candidates from
opposing parties will not have an ongoing relationship post-election.
Furthermore, political parties in this country have been trying to understand
each other for generations, so far without much success.
Finally, smooth and efficient elections are a cornerstone of democratic
transfer of power. Too much litigation threatens to derail the legitimacy of
the electoral outcome. Scholars have pointed to the dramatic increase in
litigation as a threat to the legitimacy of elections in this country.46 One hope
would be that mediation could stem this tide and help disputants avoid the
damage protracted litigation does to public confidence. Others might argue
that injecting "alternative" dispute resolution processes like mediation into an
already fraught dispute environment is more than the public could take. Most
people are not familiar with mediation or its core principles,47 and may be
more suspect of mediation than tried-and-true adversarial resolution in the
courts. 48 Litigation is at least a process that the public (and election
attorneys) understand.49
As the above discussion makes clear, there are some very real reasons to
pause when thinking through the value of mediation in post-election disputes.
11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 31 (2006) ("Facilitative processes, such as mediation, are
less appropriate in cases where facts need to be determined.").
4 6 Infra note 62, at 29.
47 Neither, for that matter, are lawyers, who are often skeptical of mediation (at best)
and seek to game the mediation process (at worst). See John Lande & Jean R. Stemlight,
The Potential Contribution ofADR to an Integrated Curriculum: Preparing Law Students
for Real World Lawyering, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 247 (2010) ("Many believe
that lawyers' adversarial methods and mindsets are inherently inconsistent with
mediation."); Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 57-59
(1982) (exploring how lawyers look at the world might contribute to lawyer distrust of
mediation); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Non-Lawyers and Mediation:
Rethinking the Professional Monopoly from a Problem-Solving Perspective, 7 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 235, 252 (2002) (lawyers' involvement in mediation might make ADR
"more adversarial and legalistic") as cited in Robert Rubinson, Mapping the World: Facts
and Meaning in Adjudication and Mediation, 63 ME. L. REv. 61, 87, n.163 (2010).
48 Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory ofADR and Public
Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REv. 949, 985 (2000) ("[w]hile training and professional
culture may help explain lawyer skepticism about ADR, the lay public also has reasons to
view ADR as less legitimate than trial.").
49 Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1087 (1984) (noting that
certain cases present "a genuine social need for an authoritative interpretation of law").
See also David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J.
2619, 2633-35 (1995).
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Indeed, the range of reasons why mediation is ill-suited to election disputes is
undoubtedly why no sustained effort has thus far been made to incorporate it.
As the following section portrays, however, there are enough shortcomings
to litigating post-election disputes that mediation deserves another look.
IV. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF POST-ELECTION LITIGATION
There is little question that post-election litigation is a necessary
component of ensuring that our elections are fair. Voters, candidates, and
parties have consistently turned to courts to resolve perplexing post-election
disputes, sometimes asking courts to impose extraordinary remedies such as
ordering a new election,50 disqualifying a candidate,5 ' declaring a winner,52
and even resolving the question of who should take office when the winning
candidate has died. 53 There is no scarcity of post-election litigation. In
50 See, e.g., Long v. Bryant, 992 So. 2d 673, 680, 686 (Ala. 2008) (upholding the
Perry Circuit Court's decision to order a runoff election after a recount revealed there
was no winner of a mayoral race); Gooch v. Hendrix, 851 P.2d 1321, 1322, 1327, 1330-
32 (Cal. 1993) (affirming the Superior Court of Fresno County's annulment of a school
board election and order for a new election when there was substantial evidence that
fraudulent votes affected the election's outcome); Thompson v. Jones, 17 So. 3d 524,
526, 529 (Miss. 2008) (ordering a special election for county sheriff after the circuit court
released its conclusion that illegal absentee ballots had voided the Democratic primary
after the general election had already occurred); Reese v. Duncan, 80 S.W.3d 650, 653,
656 (Tex. App. 2002) (upholding an order for a new election when the number of illegal
votes counted could have materially affected the outcome of the election).
51 See, e.g., Stephenson v. Woodward, 182 S.W.3d 162, 164, 173 (Ky. 2005)
(affirming the post-election disqualification of a winning state senatorial candidate who
failed to meet the residelicy requirement); Ellis v. Meeks, 957 S.W.2d 213, 214, 217 (Ky.
1997) (disqualifying a winning ward alderman candidate for visiting polling places on
election day); Smith v. Brito, 173 P.3d 351, 352, 356 (Wyo. 2007) (upholding the
disqualification of a winning town council candidate who was not a registered voter at the
time of filing).
52 See, e.g., Waltman v. Rowell, 913 So. 2d 1083, 1084-85, 1092 (Ala. 2005)
(declaring the incumbent candidate for city council the winner after the circuit court had
decided that his opponent had won after hearing an election contest); McIntosh v.
Sanders, 831 So. 2d 1111, 1112, 1116 (Miss. 2002) (affirming the Kemper County
Circuit Court's declaration of a winner of the county election commissioner race after
one of the candidates was disqualified); Huefner, supra note 24, at 297 (describing a trial
court's reversal of election results based on statistical findings concerning ballot layout
(citing Bradley v. Perrodin, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 402, 405-06 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003))).
53 See, e.g., Tataii v. Yoshina, No. 25599, 2003 Haw. LEXIS 237, at *2-7 (Haw.
May 22, 2003) (confirming that the deceased winner of the general election for a seat in
the U.S. Congress was the proper nominee and that a special election was the proper way
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exponentially increasing numbers, parties use courts to resolve election
disputes of all kinds.54 This article argues, however, that there are some very
real drawbacks to litigating post-election disputes.
Post-election disputes arise most commonly when the vote tallies are
close enough that the loser thinks he or she might win if the votes were
recounted or otherwise challenged. When an election produces a clear
winner, voters and candidates are often disinclined to mount a dispute.55
Election irregularities and inconsistencies and gaps in state election statutes
often go completely unnoticed for the simple reason that the tally did not
approach the "margin of litigation."56
When elections are close, a rush to court is common-indeed, many state
election statutes mandate that post-election disputes such as recounts be
resolved in court.57 Heading to court fulfills several needs. In the case of a
candidate calling for a recount, litigation signals that the losing candidate
will not give in; it provides publicity for a candidate who believes the
election outcome is unjust; and finally it is a means of reaching out to a
neutral party to declare judgment with (relative) finality. Although, as noted
above, many states mandate administrative and/or quasi-judicial procedures
to fill the vacancy); Lockard v. Miles, 882 N.E.2d 288, 288-89 (Ind. 2008) (affirming
that the winner of a party caucus held after the candidate who won the primary died
should be on the general ballot instead of the runner-up in the primary); Evans v. State
Election Bd. of the State of Oklahoma, 804 P.2d 1125, 1126-27, 1129, 1131 (Okla. 1990)
(determining that the candidate for district judge who won the most votes, though
deceased, was the victor and a special election should be held to fill the vacancy). See
also Faulder v. Mendocine County Bd. of Supervisors, 144 Cal. App. 4th 1362, 1366-67
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (calling for the cancellation and sealing of election results and the
scheduling of a special election when one of the two candidates for district attorney died
prior to the election).
54 Richard Hasen, The Supreme Court's Shrinking Election Law Docket, 2001-2010:
A Legacy of Bush v. Gore or Fear of the Roberts Court?, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
IRVINE SCHOOL OF LAw LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES PAPER No. 2011-11.
55 Relying on close elections to tell us whether a state's election apparatus is
functioning is less than optimal. Problems will only be revealed if and when a close
election happens. Foley, supra note 42, at 375 (in this article, Professor Foley suggests
ways that states might address election irregularities without waiting for outcome-
affecting errors to come to light.).
56 Richard Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 938 (2005).
57 See supra Part II; see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.68.011 (2007) (judicial
remedy when certain conditions are met, i.e., neglect of duty on part of an election
official, any state voter can contest the result of an election in court); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16-672 (1980) (any elector can contest results); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-14-1 (2004)
(New Mexico statute allows a candidate to contest the results of an election in court).
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prior to litigation,58 the march to court when elections are close has never
been seriously questioned. 59 It is widely held to be the cleanest way to
resolve post-election disputes. 60 Indeed, election litigation has skyrocketed
since Bush v. Gore in 2000.61
However, there are real reasons to question the assumption that court is
the best place for post-election dispute resolution. As seasoned election
lawyers will tell you, post-election litigation is anything but straightforward.
Post-election litigation can drag on for months and months and can cost
candidates and taxpayers millions of dollars. Lawyers in the Franken-
Coleman recount in Minnesota estimated a price tag of $10 million in legal
fees alone. 62 On a cost basis, alternatives should certainly be explored.
58 See supra Part II.
59 Kovick and Young note that one factor opposing the use of ADR is in instances
where countries have a "strong, credible and independent judici[al] ... system . . . that
can be relied upon to hear and resolve election complaints in a fair and timely manner."
KOVICK & YOUNG, supra note 37, at 255. Because the U.S. judiciary is widely seen as
credible, independent, and strong, the tendency is to assume that courts are the natural
venue for election disputes.
60 Foley, supra note 42, at 376 ("The prevailing public conception of courts, right or
wrong, is that their job is to decide [election] cases according to the requirements laid
down by the law... without regard to discretionary considerations of politics."). As noted
above, some even advocate for increased judicial oversight of elections. See Recent Case,
Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565 (2004), 118 HARv. L.
REV. 2461, 2464 (2005) (advocating more judicial oversight of unilateral interpretations
of federal election law made by partisan state election officials).
61 See Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1,
28-29 (2007); Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69 (2009).
Hasen's results show that election litigation more than doubled shortly after 2001 and has
held steady at that amount for the decade since Bush v. Gore. Pre-2000, the country
averaged 94 election cases (in both state and federal courts) annually. Id. at 90. The
average number of election-related cases over the past ten years has been 239. Richard L.
Hasen, Election Law Litigation Remained at Double Its Pre-Bush v. Gore Rate,
ELECTION LAW BLOG (March 31, 2011), http://electionlawblog.org/archives/019119.html.
62 See JAY WEINER, THIS IS NOT FLORIDA: How AL FRANKEN WON THE MINNESOTA
SENATE RECOUNT, 223-24 (2010) (during the 2008 Minnesota senate recount and related
litigation, candidates Al Franken and Norm Coleman spent $5.7 million and $4.4 million
on legal fees, respectively); John Gibeaut, Electing to Litigate As Primaries Begin,
Voters, State Officials and Lawyers Brace for More and More Lawsuits, 94 A.B.A. J., 40,
46 (2008) (one election lawsuit cost the state of Ohio more than $5 million.); Erin
Butcher-Lyden, supra note 4, at 537 (just ten of the twenty-three lawsuits against the state
of Ohio during the 2004 election cost the state a combined $1 million.); CONNY
McCORMACK, THE COST OF STATEWIDE RECOUNTS: A CASE STUDY OF MINNESOTA AND
WASHINGTON, THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES 23, 35 (2010), available at
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/MNWA-recounts-report.pdf
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Aside from cost, protracted litigation risks alienating the electorate. 63
The public may be satisfied when election controversies are decided quickly
and resolutely in court, but they become less enamored when litigation drags
on for months and months, particularly if an elected seat remains vacant as a
result. But more than practical concerns surface: when elections are decided
in courts, voters come to believe that they lack voice. Given the dismal state
of voter participation in elections in this country,64 protracted and habitual
litigation poses a real risk to the franchise.
A further reason litigation is problematic in post-election disputes is the
issue of courts' relationships with the political process. Time and again,
judges in election law cases note a profound hesitance to enter the "political
thicket." As Justice Frankfurter wrote in Colegrove v. Green in 1946, "[i]t is
hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the
people." 65 What is more, scholars have noted that judges may hesitate to
impose remedies in the election context in which even minor corrections can
have broad, systemic implications. 66
Courts are also awkward places to resolve post-election disputes in cases
that lack statutory guidance. When state election statutes compel judicial
review, those statutes are often silent when it comes to substantive guidelines
on how courts should proceed. 67 As a result, courts often have to choose
(finding a manual recount in Minnesota cost counties a total of $460,000 and a manual
and machine recount combined cost the state of Washington $1.16 million).
63 Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1, 5-6
(2007) ("Bush v. Gore's main legacy has been to increase the amount of election-related
litigation. As election law has become a political strategy, it threatens to further
undermine public confidence in the electoral process. No lemonade, only lemons.").
64 A study of voter turnout since 1945 listed the United States at No. 138 (out of
169) in a ranking of countries votes to voting age population ratio. See Voter Turnout
Rates from a Comparative Perspective, available at
http://www.idea.int/publications/vt/upload/Voter%20turnout.pdf.
65 Colegove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553-54 (1946).
66 See Developments in the Law: Voting and Democracy, VII. Election
Administration: Judicial Review and Remedial Deterrence, 119 HARv. L. REv. 1188,
1191 (2006) ("[j]udges may be deterred from ordering a systemic remedy [in election
cases] because it appears more difficult to implement than the remedy in a standard [non-
election] case between individuals."). See also Richard L. Hasen, Judges as Political
Regulators: Evidence and Options for Institutional Change, in RACE, REFORM, AND
REGULATION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (Guy-Uriel Charles, Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang eds., 2011).
67 Huefner, supra note 24, at 277 (citing Developments in the Law-Elections,
supra note 21, at 1311 (noting that election contest statutes provide "little guidance as to
the grounds that are cognizable")).
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between available remedies (adjustment of vote totals, new elections, fines,
penalties or injunctions, and so forth) with very little to go on aside from
common law and principles of equity.68
Another challenge in resolving disputed elections in courts is the related
problem of perceived judicial neutrality. In the past, when state supreme
courts have split on election cases along partisan lines, as was the case, for
example, in the 1982 Illinois governor's race between Republican incumbent
James Thomson and Democratic opponent Adlai Stevenson III, the
credibility and neutrality of the judiciary is threatened. As Professor Foley
observes of this phenomenon:
Whether these split decisions.. .precisely correspond to the partisan
affiliation of the judges on those courts is beside the point. Nor does it
matter whether any of these judges were actually motivated by political
considerations, rather than their good faith perception of what the law
required of them. Rather, the problem is that these teeter-totter rulings
reveal that the applicable law is not so crystal clear that the judges have no
choice but to follow its command, and therefore the judges are free to
decide the case in accordance with their political preferences if they are so
inclined. 69
The public's confidence in neutral, non-political adjudication of disputes
is put at risk each time an election case, by nature fraught with partisan
conflict, confronts the courts.
A final reason why courts are problematic forums for election disputes is
that judges are often ill-equipped to handle election law matters. 70 Most of
68 Id.; see also Daniel P. Tokaji, Commentary, An Unsafe Harbor: Recounts,
Contests, and the Electoral College, 106 MICH. L. REv. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 84, 87 (2008)
(noting the awkward problem of state election laws deferring to federal laws that do not
exist, Tokaji provides the example of Section 3515.08 of the Ohio Revised Code under
which contests of elections to federal office are to be "conducted in accordance with the
applicable provisions of federal law." Tokaji goes on to note the trouble with this
scheme: "The problem is that there are no federal laws allowing judicial contest
proceedings over disputed federal elections. Nor is it clear that Congress would have the
constitutional power to impose such a procedure for presidential elections, even it if so
desired. Instead, federal law refers back to the 'final determination' made under state law
pursuant to 3 U.S.C. § 5. In other words, we have circular references . .. .The effect of
Ohio's law thus appears to be the elimination of any judicial contest proceedings in any
federal election taking place in that state.").
69 Foley, supra note 42, at 377-78.
70 Recognizing the lack of resources state judges face in election cases, the National
Conference of Chief Justices of State Supreme Courts identified this as a problem of
great significance and encouraged the National Center for State Courts, partnering with
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the approximately 25,00071 state and 60072 federal court judges in the United
States lack specific expertise in election law. Many election law cases
involve matters of first impression that must be resolved quickly in the
context of intense partisan conflict-a pressure-filled circumstance judges
rightly abhor.
For these reasons, resolving post-election disputes in court is not always
optimal. Although litigation has its place, the next section explores ways in
which mediation might, in certain instances, play an important role in
alleviating pressure on courts to resolve post-election disputes.
V. THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION IN POST-ELECTION DISPUTES
As a general matter, mediators are trained to guide parties through
disputes in ways that make the dispute resolution process more efficient and
the outcome more solid. Mediators are trained to help open channels of
communication, to facilitate the process of direct negotiation, to help parties
understand and frame their dispute, and to act as an agent of reality in
instances where parties may have an inflated sense of the strength of an
argument.73 Mediation is effective because mediators can assist parties in
solving problems "more integratively, at less cost, with greater party
participation, and with the possibility of preventing.. .some disputes." 74
Whether these generally accepted benefits of mediation have application in
the post-election context hinges on two central variables: first, the nature of
the post-election dispute at issue; and second the style of mediation
employed.
the William & Mary Law School, to form the Election Law Program to help address this
problem by creating resources for judges on election law. See ELECTION LAW PROGRAM,
http://www.electionlawissues.org.
71 Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, State Court Organization
(2004), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/sco04.pdf.
72 U.S. Courts, Judicial Facts and Figures 2009 (2009), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2009/Table 10 1.p
df.
7 JOHN W. COOLEY, THE MEDIATOR'S HANDBOOK 30-31 (2d ed. 2006).
74 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral:
Creativity and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L. REv. 785, 802 (1999).
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A. Which Post-Election Disputes are Appropriate for Mediation?
The International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) recently
examined the use of ADR in election conflicts.75 The book is aimed at
building election infrastructure in post-conflict and developing democracies.
Its authors identify several types of election disputes ill-suited for ADR
including: (1) disputes relating to fundamental rights, (2) cases in which
binding precedent is desirable, and (3) cases in which the court system can
provide a timely, credible decision.76 These factors provide a useful starting
point. There are certainly instances in which fundamental rights come into
play in post-election disputes. Any time a ballot is invalidated, for example, a
voter's fundamental right to exercise the franchise is jeopardized.77 In
addition, there is very often the need for precedent setting in post-election
disputes, particularly in the recount context, as states build experience
managing them.78 Finally, thanks to the health of the U.S. judicial system, its
courts are capable of delivering timely and credible decisions in the majority
of instances.
Although these general exemptions provide a good rough guide, this
article argues that there are a certain subset of post-election disputes which
do not directly involve fundamental rights, for which administrative
precedent setting is more important than judicial precedent setting, and which
courts are ill-equipped to manage: post-election process disputes. Post-
election process disputes are distinguished from outcome-determinative post-
election disputes. For the purposes of this article, "outcome-determinative"
refers to those disputes for which the resolution will directly impact a vote
tally. An example of an outcome-determinative dispute would be whether or
not the voter intended to vote for Candidate X or whether the factors required
to prove fraud were sufficiently argued. These disputes require a third-party
neutral such as a judge or election official to issue a ruling one way or
another.
75 GUIDELINES FOR UNDERSTANDING, ADJUDICATING, AND RESOLVING DISPUTES IN
ELECTIONS (Chad Vickery ed., 2011), available at
http://www.ifes.org/-/media/Files/Publications/Books/201 1/GUARDE finalpublication.
pdf.
76 Id. at 254-55.
77 As one state supreme court justice noted, "the right to have one's vote counted is
as important as the act itself." Coleman v. Ritchie, 758 N.W.2d 306, 311 (Minn. 2008).
78 See, e.g., Tamney v. Atkins, 209 N.Y. 202, 205 (N.Y. 1913) (cited broadly for the
proposition that the ability of courts to engage in judicial review of election disputes is
bounded by state statute).
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Unlike outcome-determinative election disputes, process disputes are
those encompassing mechanics and procedural rules for how, in the case of
recounts, votes will be counted.79 In the context of a recount, these kinds of
process disputes can include the following kinds of issues:8 0
* When can a candidate challenge ballots?
* When can a candidate examine election materials?
* What is the definition of a valid ballot?
* How will voter intent be determined?
* What are the standards for determining whether a ballot has
met technical or procedural requirements (such as initials by poll
clerks)? Should ballots be counted if the technical defect is not caused
by the voter?
* Should absentee ballots be counted if postmarked prior to
Election Day but received by the clerk after Election Day?
In the vast majority of jurisdictions, when a recount is triggered, either
automatically or because the losing candidate has petitioned for a recount, it
is far from clear what procedural rules will govern the recount. State statutes
and regulations often leave unresolved a wide range of procedural questions
from matters as seemingly insignificant, such as where tables will be set up,
to significant questions of standards for determining valid ballots. Even when
state statutes and regulations include specific procedural rules, wide gaps
must be filled before the recount can proceed.8 '
Vagaries concerning the validity of absentee ballots illustrate the point. If
absentee ballot envelopes must be signed by the voter, should a ballot count
79 Note that the line between outcome-determinative versus post-election process
disputes is not always clear. Process decisions can turn out to be outcome-determinative.
For example, in one of the closest elections in U.S. history, the 2004 Washington state
governor's race, candidates asked a judge, inter alia, to pick a method by which to
eliminate illegal votes. The judge could order a new election, require direct evidence (i.e.,
ask voters to testify), or use a "proportional deduction" method by which the judge would
estimate whom each illegal voter voted for based on the precinct in which the voter lived.
The choice between these various processes could be outcome-determinative. One can
imagine that a mediated resolution of this process question would have been an effective
means of resolving the dispute, but might have indeed determined the outcome. See
Borders v. Kings County, No. 05-2-00027-3, Slip Op. at 4 (Wash. Super. Ct. June 24,
2005) discussed in Developments in the Law: Voting and Democracy, IV. Deducting
Illegal Votes in Contested Elections, 119 HARv. L. REv. 1155, 1155-56 (2006).
80 These examples are drawn from TIMOTHY DOWNS, ET. AL., THE RECOUNT PRIMER
19-20 (1994).
81 Telephone interview with election law expert John Hardin Young, Partner,
Sandler, Reiff, Young & Lamb (May 24, 2011).
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if signed by the voter's spouse? What if the spouse has a power of attorney?
Must the power of attorney be a blanket power of attorney? What if the
power of attorney was obtained for health decisions only? What about
distinguishing marks on ballots like signatures that would typically nullify a
vote? Overseas and military voters often write passport numbers or military
ID numbers on absentee ballots. Should these votes be tossed? If a complete
absentee ballot requires a full address, what if the voter leaves off her zip
code? What if the voter has moved to a different apartment at the same
address but lists the old apartment number on the absentee ballot envelope?
What if the voter abbreviates "Rd." or leaves the word "Road" off altogether
when stating her address? Literally dozens of such questions hang in the
balance in recounts. And that's just with respect to absentee ballots.
Although process disputes are not directly outcome-determinative, this is
not to say they matter less. In fact, they matter quite a bit. As we have seen in
countless recounts, lawyers on both sides forward impassioned arguments for
why ambiguities in statutory process language should be managed one way
versus another. Resolving process disputes is tricky business. Each side
invariably will argue that even the smallest process decision can have an
impact on the final tally. As one prominent recount lawyer explains, "Every
procedural call has an advantage and disadvantage that both sides will fight
tooth and nail to preserve." 82 Depending on their assessment of the impact on
their client, most election lawyers will admit to alternately forwarding
impassioned arguments for strict technical compliance with a vague statutory
provision in one instance, and equally impassioned arguments for the idea
that technicalities impede acknowledging voter intent in the next.
There are numerous ways in which states attempt to fill procedural gaps
in recounts. In Virginia, for example, state statute requires a judge to set forth
the specific procedure that will guide the recount process. 83 In practice, the
state court judge will work with the parties to hammer out a preliminary
procedural order followed by a final order. 84 In other states, a state board of
8 2 Id
83 VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-802(B) (1950) (". . . the chief judge of the circuit court
shall call a preliminary hearing at which (i) motions may be disposed of and (ii) the rules
of procedure may be fixed, both subject to review by the full court.").
84 See, e.g., Goode v. Perriello, Recount Procedural Order, Case No. CLO8002666-
00 (2008) (specifies the procedures leading up to the recount, the date and time of the
recount, the manner of court supervision of the recount, the location of the recount, how
the vote tabulators will be programmed, what the testing requirements will be, how
recount officials will be selected, rules governing recount observers, training procedures
for recount officials, contingencies for inclement weather, and various other procedural
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elections or the secretary of state's office will facilitate a process to
determine the procedural rules of the recount.85 At the other end of the
spectrum, in some states the authority to fill process gaps left by election
statutes falls to individual county election administrators, which, as we know
after Bush v. Gore, can lead to frustrating results. 86
Experience has shown that judicial misjudgment in resolving process
disputes-either because of unanticipated consequences of a given judicial
process decree, or events unanticipated at the time of the ruling-may
protract process disputes unnecessarily. Process decisions in post-election
disputes-particularly recounts-involve sophisticated and sometimes
unknowable variables. Judges, many of whom have never tried election
matters before, are seldom equipped to understand the impact of one process
decision versus another. They are instead reliant on passionate partisan
arguments of campaign attorneys. Even a politically neutral judge who takes
her political leanings out of the mix will feel uncertain in this territory. This
is to say nothing of the elected, partisan judge who might be called to make
process decisions.
In an environment in which judges and state election administrators often
lack guidance on procedural details, election attorneys routinely rush to fill
the vacuum. Individual campaigns hire nationally prominent, partisan
election attorneys to help navigate procedural uncertainties. From Bush v.
Gore to Coleman v. Franken, fierce partisan election lawyering has become
the accepted model.87 In many recounts, partisan recount experts are often
details. The judge in this case allowed the parties access to the process of establishing
procedural rules.
85 See infra Part VI.B.
86 Wisconsin provides a good example of this decentralized approach. Kevin
Kennedy of the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board website confirms this
characterization by noting that "Wisconsin has the most decentralized election
administration in the United States". The site goes on to note that Wisconsin state law
gives each county's Board of Canvassers the primary authority to conduct recounts, and
to decide which ballots should and should not be counted. See Statewide Supreme Court
Recount Update, http://gab.wi/node/1849.
87 Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 957-59
(2005) (documenting the increase of election-related litigation since 2000); Richard L.
Hasen, Will Armies of Lawyers in Service to Political Parties Determine Election 2008?,
THE LOYOLA LAWYER, Aug. 19, 2008, at 5 (anticipating a number of lawyers-many of
them volunteer-deployed in the 2008 election); Susan Greene et al., Legal Eagles Will
Eye Voting: 'Armies ofLawyers' Tapped, DENVER POST, Oct. 17, 2004, at Cl; Kenneth P.
Vogel, Election Lawyers are a Hot Commodity, POLITICO (Mar. 6, 2007, 5:29 pm),
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the only real source of combined wisdom on the subject. Experienced
election attorneys who have seen recounts unfold in other states have a huge
leg up when dealing with state administrators and judges who lack a multi-
state perspective. As the Minnesota case study below illustrates, this
phenomenon has the problematic effect of leaving democracy in the hands of
whichever side has the more sophisticated lawyer. Even in a case where
lawyers are evenly matched, lawyers are by trade zealous and partisan
advocates for their client's interests, not the public interest.
What is often missing is a seasoned expert to guide the process and raise
flags when process issues arise. Experienced election mediators could
perform just such a role. The next section examines the second variable: the
model of mediation might be most appropriate in this setting.
B. Which Mediation Model is Appropriate for Mediation?
The question of whether mediators can do a better job than courts in
helping resolve post-election process disputes can only be answered by
understanding the nature of modern mediation practice and the types of
mediation on offer. Many mediators prefer a mediation style in which they
do not weigh in on the substance of the dispute, instead facilitating a process
through which the parties can reach an agreement that meets their interests.
This approach is generally known as "facilitative mediation."88 A facilitative
mediator refrains from, for example, providing her opinion about which side
has made the better argument or has the stronger case, even when pressed by
one or both sides to do so (as is common). A facilitative mediator will also
refrain from suggesting options for the parties to consider, preferring instead
to facilitate a process in which the parties generate their own options.89 But
just because a mediator adopts a facilitative approach does not mean the
mediator cannot be "directive" of the process. In fact, facilitative mediators
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0307/3019.html (finding there is more demand
than supply of top-caliber election lawyers).
88 Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 937, 943-44 (1997) (facilitative mediation is a "dispute resolution process
through which parties are taught how to resolve their own disputes, listen to each other
differently, broaden their own capacities for understanding and collaboration, and create
resolutions that build relationships, generate more harmony, and are 'win-win."').
89 The philosophical underpinning behind this principle is at least in part, that by
suggesting an option the mediator might appear non-neutral, or as if he or she is pushing
a resolution on the parties. Doing so flies in the face of a core value in mediation: self-
determination. See Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not
Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 937, 945 (1997).
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recognize driving the process as their chief role. So, for example, the
facilitative mediator may make decisions about which issue will be discussed
when, when (and if) private caucuses should take place, how broadly or
narrowly the parties' dispute should be addressed in mediation, and so
forth.90 By taking control of the process, facilitative mediators enhance the
efficiency of dispute resolution, ensure that the full scope of the dispute is
addressed, constructively enhance communication between the two sides,
and assist the parties in generating realistic options.
At the other end of the spectrum is what is often referred to as
"evaluative" mediation.9' The evaluative mediator weighs in on substance.
The evaluative mediator, for example, may give her opinion on the value of
settlement, the strength of an argument, or the mediator's opinion of how a
court might rule. Evaluative mediators might also suggest options for the
parties to consider. Evaluative strategies are often employed to move the
mediation forward, typically when the facilitative model reaches an impasse.
Often evaluation is solicited by the parties.92 Mediators more comfortable
with an evaluative role will weigh in on certain matters preemptively.
Evaluative mediators view facilitative mediation as too passive, robbing
90 Leonard Riskin described a continuum in the role of mediators on the question of
"problem definition" between those mediators who take a broad approach versus those
who prefer to mediate only the narrow issue presented. See Leonard L. Riskin, Mediator
Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 111,
111 (1994) ("[a] mediator who starts with a broad orientation.. .assumes that the parties
can benefit if the mediation goes beyond the narrow issues that normally define legal
disputes. Important interests often lie beneath the positions that the participants assert.
Accordingly, the mediator [can].. .help the participants understand and fulfill those
interests-at least if they wish to do so.").
91 For a view of the dangers of evaluative mediation, see generally Lela Love, The
Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 937
(1997); see also Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, "Evaluative" Mediation Is an
Oxymoron, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 31 (1996).
92 The need for case evaluation has evolved into a specialty commonly referred to as
Early Neutral Evaluation (ENE). ENE "was first developed in federal district court in the
Northern District of California" as a process by which a party (or parties) to a dispute
seeks out an evaluation of their claim from an expert. Frank E. A. Sander & Lukasz
Rozdeiczer, Matching Cases and Dispute Resolution Procedures: Detailed Analysis
Leading to A Mediation-Centered Approach, 11 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 13 (2006).
ENE is seen as a settlement technique for disputes in which parties are far apart and
might benefit from hearing from a neutral party how the law likely applies to their case or
hearing an objective assessment of the strength of their case. See American Arbitration
Association, Early Neutral Evaluation: Getting an Expert's Assessment. Practical
Guidelines and Steps for Getting Started, available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=35761 (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
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mediators of tools that could be used to move disputes more quickly towards
resolution. Such evaluative mediators argue that in certain circumstances
mediators better help parties resolve disputes if they selectively address the
substance of the dispute where appropriate and/or offer suggestions about
how it might be resolved.93
Although many, including this author, remain dedicated to the idea that
facilitative mediation is preferable in most instances, 94 there is growing
acknowledgment that in certain kinds of mediations, evaluative techniques
may be appropriate. 95 Mediators who possess substantive expertise in a
specific field can use that knowledge and experience to aid the resolution of
certain kinds of disputes. 96 Post-election process dispute resolution, for
reasons to follow, falls into this category.
Scholars have pointed to a number of ways an "expert" mediator can be
useful. For example, a mediator with substantive expertise can help by
educating the parties about ways in which the law may vindicate their rights
or ways in which similarly situated parties have resolved their disputes. 97
Mediators with substantive expertise may also help parties avoid an unfair
result.98 Mediators with subject matter experience can also raise hidden
dangers that parties might not foresee or provide ideas for options that have
been useful in other contexts. 99
93 L. Randolph Lowry, To Evaluate or Not: That Is Not the Question, 38 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 48, 55 (2000) ("evaluation is a technique to move parties from
positions they have taken that have resulted in impasse to a mutually agreeable position
so a settlement then takes place.").
94 Huge concerns about party self-determination, mediator neutrality, and problems
associated with quality control of mediator evaluations drives this skepticism. See supra
note 82.
95 It should be noted that facilitative mediation techniques need not be thrown out
the window when an evaluative model is adopted. Indeed, the best evaluative mediators
recognize the benefits of facilitative principles and work to incorporate them as they
mediate, effectively shifting between a facilitative and evaluative approach as the
situation dictates. Telephone Interview with Howard Bellman (August 15, 2011).
96 Brian Jarrett, The Future of Mediation: A Sociological Perspective, 2009 J. DisP.
RESOL. 49, 70 (2009) (noting that sector specialization has led in some instances to the
beneficial use of a more evaluative approach, Jarrett uses U.N. conciliation efforts as an
example in which, "the United Nations provides a kind of practical power politics in its
mediation programs that have precious little to do with the objectivity, impartiality, and
neutrality associated with the facilitative model.").
97 Scott H. Hughes, Facilitative Mediation or Evaluative Mediation: May Your
Choice Be A Wise One, 59 ALA. LAW. 246, 247 (1998).
9 8 d.
99 Cris M. Currie, Mediating Off the Grid, 59 DisP. RESOL. J. 9, 12 (2004).
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Perhaps the biggest reason an evaluative model may be useful in post-
election process disputes has to do with information imbalance. One
campaign might hire a sophisticated legal team that understands how various
process decisions affect its candidate. If the other campaign has not hired a
sophisticated election attorney (or if the attorney hired proves to be less
skillful than opposing counsel) this imbalance might prove a great
disadvantage. This disadvantage is not just problematic for the candidate, but
also for the voters who selected that candidate. In a recount scenario, poor or
uninformed lawyering can result in the disenfranchisement of voters. As
noted above, state election administrators and judges also vary widely in
process sophistication. Over time, should mediation become more widely
used in this context, a cadre of "election mediators" might develop. One
could imagine that just as Ken Feinberg is now the go-to person for mass
disaster claims,100 specialized and respected election mediators might
eventually apply accumulated expertise to resolving post-election process
disputes efficiently. Seasoned election law mediators who have developed a
track record for helping parties identify and resolve process disputes could
prove invaluable towards more efficient resolution of post-election process
matters. 101
Election mediators might prove useful for a further reason. Parties in
mediation have more flexibility in crafting solutions that resolve more
aspects of their dispute than the narrow set of issues presented in a court
proceeding.102 This is at least in part because a good mediator will foster a
100 Ashby Jones, Ken Feinberg (Who Else?) To Handle Oil-Spill Escrow Fund,
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (June 16, 2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/06/16/ken-feinberg-
who-else-to-handle-oil-spill-escrow-fund.
101 In an article in which she argues that lawyers should adopt a more problem-
solving, less adversarial role, Carrie Menkel-Meadow describes a perspective that could
be used in the election dispute resolution context to good effect:
[L]awyer-mediators may use law in their work as facilitators of negotiated solutions
to litigational or transactional problems: [they can] help . . .[clients] evaluate the
merits of an argument, the legality of a solution, assisting in the drafting of an
agreement, or in cases of evaluative mediation, actually predicting what a court
might do with a particular case or offering particular substantive resolutions of
particular legal issues.
See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 74, at 804.
102 Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 33 (1996) (A
facilitative mediator who takes a broad approach to dispute resolution "will help the
parties define the scope of the problem to be addressed in the mediation, often
encouraging them to explore underlying interests to the extent that they wish to do so."
Riskin contrasts this approach with mediators who "accept the obvious problem
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process in which all relevant issues-even those not originally
contemplated-will be confronted to ensure that the settlement reached is
workable, comprehensive, and has staying power. This approach could be of
great service in resolving post-election process disputes. Rather than forcing
a court to rule on countless micro-process disputes or waiting for those
disputes to arise organically down the road, an experienced election mediator
might anticipate problems and ensure that the full scope of the dispute-and
possible options for resolution-are on the table.103 Addressing the full scope
of process issues in the early stages of a recount or contest could greatly
enhance efficiency. 104
Finally, injecting an experienced mediator into the mix early on could
have provided an important educative function. In reflecting on his
experiences in the 2008 recount (and the 2010 recount), 05 Minnesota
Supreme Court Justice Paul Anderson sees the wisdom of bringing in an
presented" and do not look to resolve any part of the dispute not immediately at the
table.)
103 Much of this legwork can be done in the context of a "conflict assessment"
(sometimes referred to as a "convening assessment," in which the mediator analyzes and
diagnose the dispute, identify stakeholders, map their interests, and assess the scope of
the dispute. See FRANK FISHER, GERALD MILLER & MARA S. SIDNEY EDS., HANDBOOK OF
PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS: THEORY, POLITICS AND METHODS 515-16 (2007); see also
Laurence Susskind & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK
(1999).
104 The best argument against mediator evaluation in post-election disputes is that an
evaluative mediator may take sides in the course of providing advice on the dispute. This
is particularly problematic given the difficulty of finding a nonpartisan mediator. See
infra Section II.
The problem of impartiality in evaluative mediation is well recognized. See, e.g.,
Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of ADR and Public Civil
Justice, 47 UCLA L. REv. 949, 1092 (2000) (noting that "bias concerns may . . . be
heightened in evaluative mediations, in which the mediator is providing an opinion on the
merits of the parties' relative positions, precisely for the purpose of influencing the
parties' settlements"). This concern is, however, allayed by narrowing the category of
election dispute to be mediated to process disputes only.
105 In November 2010, Minnesota underwent another large scale recount, this time
between gubernatorial candidates Republican Thomas Emmer, Democrat Mark Dayton,
and Independent Tom Homer. A close race (margin of .42%) triggered an automatic
recount. It took just over a month to declare Dayton the winner by 8,715 votes with 99.99
percent votes recounted and 765 ballots contested (not enough to secure victory for
Emmer). Robert Yoon, Democrat Dayton Wins Minnesota Gov. Recount, CNN POLITICS,
Dec. 4, 2000, http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/12/04/democrat-dayton-wins-
minnesota-gov-recount/.
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outsider to help educate the judiciary and state election administration about
process decisions. He explains:
In a recount, the deciding body is inundated by partisanship. If a neutral
mediator could narrow the set of disputes that come before the deciding
body by working with the parties to eliminate the outliers, the efficiency of
the process would be greatly enhanced. 106
Good election attorneys are always thinking two or three moves ahead.
Adjudicatory bodies therefore are unable to get input on process matters from
attorneys in recounts without also getting a large dollop of partisan
maneuvering. Mediators could help educate the judiciary not about which
side has the better argument, but about process intricacies and decisions that
the adjudicatory body must address in order to arrive at a fair and
comprehensive process.107 Election attorneys will not be fans of the idea.
Even still, reigning in the adversarial process in this context might be an
important step forward.
Before moving on to examine a case study, an additional mediation
model bears mention. One of the initial process questions mediators must
confront is whether to "co-mediate." Co-mediation refers to the common
practice of two mediators working together as a team to mediate a dispute. 08
The benefits of co-mediation are multiple. Most of the advantages of co-
mediation are practical. The co-mediation model provides another set of eyes
and ears to help resolve a dispute. For example, while one mediator is
talking, the other can be attentive to verbal and non-verbal cues from the
parties. Many mediators also prefer the co-mediation model on the theory
that two minds are better than one. When one mediator might be stuck, the
other might have ideas about how to proceed. A final practical benefit of co-
mediation relates to strategic pairing. For example, a less experienced
mediator might be paired with a more experienced mediator for training
purposes. Mediators with divergent backgrounds or approaches might also be
paired to enhance their ability to handle a complex dispute.
106 Telephone interview with the Hon. Paul H. Anderson, Associate Justice,
Minnesota Supreme Court (May 27, 2011).
107 Note that any mediator interaction with the court, even if solely educative in
purpose, should be handled thoughtfully. A structure in which a mediator is perceived as
"reporting back" to the court may adversely impact mediator neutrality. Telephone
Interview with Howard Bellman (August 15, 2011).
108 Lee A. Rosengard, Learning from Law Firms: Using Co-Mediation to Train New
Mediators, 59 DisP. REsOL. J. 16, 18 (2004).
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An additional benefit to co-mediation goes beyond practical advantage.
Some mediators find that their neutrality is enhanced through the co-
mediation model. One obvious example is the use of a male mediator paired
with a female mediator when there is gender imbalance among parties (for
example, in a mediation between a divorcing husband and wife). The
prospect of enhanced neutrality through co-mediation is interesting to
contemplate in the election context, where it could prove quite useful in
tempering concerns about partisan affiliation of mediators. Using a co-
mediation model could alleviate perceived bias or lack of political neutrality
in a post-election dispute. Co-mediators could be appointed in a number of
ways to enhance perceived neutrality. A court or other appointing body could
tap two mediators generally affiliated with opposing parties in the dispute;
for example, one mediator with a known record of supporting Democrats and
another with a known record of supporting Republicans.109 This
arrangement, however, might feed fears that the mediation might become
overly politicized. A possible solution would be to allow each party to
choose a mediator from a list of mediators with known affiliation to the
opposing party. This would force each party to choose the most politically
moderate mediator it could find.11 0 Although it is possible to imagine much
fretting and handwringing about which mediators are selected, choosing a
mediator is a much less difficult project than choosing the members of a
tribunal or canvassing board since these bodies, unlike mediators, are called
on to make rulings. Mediators, though they may employ evaluative
techniques, by definition lack authority to force an outcome one way or the
other.
The benefits of using election mediators to resolve post-election process
disputes are not just benefits in theory. The next section uses the 2008
Minnesota senate race to examine whether mediation might have played a
useful role.
109 Note that selecting co-mediators on the basis of partisan affiliation alone would
be a grave mistake. Indeed more important than perceived partisan affiliation should
always be expertise in mediation, particularly co-mediators should be selected from a
pool of mediators who are (1) respected within the mediation and election law
communities, (2) have a solid track record successfully mediating public disputes, and (3)
are able to work effectively with one another as mediators in terms of mediation style and
approach. This might be a tall order at present, but the hope is that a cadre of qualified
individuals will develop over time. Telephone Interview with Howard Bellman (August
15, 2011).
110 Foley, supra note 42, at 378.
352
[Vol. 27:2 2012]
MEDIATION AND POST-ELECTION LITIGATION
VI. CASE STUDY: THE 2008 FRANKEN-COLEMAN RECOUNT
There is perhaps no better recent example than the Franken-Coleman
recount of 2008 to demonstrate the possibilities of mediation in post-election
process disputes. First, the Franken-Coleman recount was religiously
documented by the Minnesota Secretary of State's office, 1 1 the judiciary,112
and the state and national press, providing a bird's eye view into the
process."I 3 Second, the process was protracted, lasting eight months from
start to finish and featuring multiple "mini-disputes" over the course of the
recount and subsequent contest proceedings.11 4 The scale of the recount
offers opportunities to examine which kinds of post-election disputes might
be suited to ADR and which are not. Finally, many of the major players in
the race are serendipitously friends of my home institution, William & Mary
Law School." 5 With this in mind, the discussion below examines the
Franken-Coleman recount with an eye towards whether mediation might
have usefully been injected. Importantly, the 2008 Minnesota recount was in
many ways sui generis, replete with local oddities and peculiar circumstances
that would not likely surface in other post-election disputes. With this in
mind, the discussion below examines the Franken-Coleman recount with an
I 11 See 2008 U.S. Senate Race: Recount Information, OFFICE OF THE MINN. SEC. OF
STATE, http://www.sos.state.mn.us/index.aspx?page=1405 (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
112 See Minnesota Senate Seat '08 Election, MINNESOTA JUDICIAL BRANCH,
http://www.mncourts.gov/?page=3409 (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
113 Weiner, supra note 62, at 169-70.
114 The initial count ended November 18. The close margin resulted in an automatic,
mandatory hand recount. The State Canvassing Board then certified the recount results on
January 5 at which point the Coleman campaign filed an election contest. On April 13, a
three-judge panel resolved the contest in favor of Franken; the verdict was affirmed by
the Minnesota Supreme Court in June 2009. See STEVEN F. HUEFNER, NATHAN A.
CEMENSKA, DANIEL P. TOKAI & EDWARD B. FOLEY, ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ, FROM
REGISTRATION TO RECOUNTS REVISITED 15-16 (2011), available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/projects/registration-to-recounts/ 2 01 1 edition.pdf.
For the purposes of this discussion, recount and contest will be used interchangeably.
115 Marc Elias taught a course on Post-Election Litigation in Fall 2011 for William
& Mary Law; Ben Ginsberg serves on William & Mary's Election Law Program
Advisory Board and has spoken several times at the law school; Secretary of State Mark
Ritchie recently traveled to Williamsburg to participate in the 2011 Election Law
Symposium on the role of secretaries of state in elections; and the Hon. Justice Paul
Anderson of the Minnesota Supreme Court and this author are members of the planning
committee for the William & Mary Law School Privacy and Public Access to Court
Records Conference, which takes place every eighteen months in Williamsburg, VA (see
http://www.legaltechcenter.net/aspx/conferences.8th-conference-on-privacy-public-
access-to-court-records/).
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eye towards disaggregating post-election disputes to analyze when and
whether mediation might have been productively injected.
A. Early Attempt to Stop Counting of Ballots
In his engaging book on the 2008 Franken-Coleman recount, Jay Weiner
identifies several instances when the parties rushed to court. In one early
example, a few days before the statute-mandated manual recount, the
discovery of thirty-two uncounted absentee ballots in Minneapolis prompted
the Coleman team to file for a temporary restraining order to prevent these
ballots (and, reaching for the moon, any other ballots statewide not counted
on Election Day) from being counted."16
At a hastily called Saturday morning hearing the day after the Coleman
team filed its motion, Ramsey County Chief Judge Kathleen Geiran was
extremely hesitant to issue the order, citing concerns about jurisdiction.
Minnesota election procedure required election contests to be overseen by an
appointed three-judge panel.11 7 After bipartisan bickering and accusations
leveled back and forth, the judge ultimately refused to enter a temporary
restraining order or, for that matter, as the Franken side demanded, award
$1,460 in attorney's fees. The motion denied, votes in the end were counted,
but not after what is described as a series of press moves calculated to
misinform."l8 Instructive for these purposes, "[i]n this initial scuffle between
116 Weiner, supra note 62, at 28.
117 Judge Kathleen Gearin dismissed the matter because no party had yet filed an
election contest lawsuit. Such a lawsuit would be filed in the Ramsey District Court, and
would be subject to MINN. STAT. § 209.045 (2008). As prescribed by statute, the case
would then be determined in Ramsey County by a three-judge panel appointed by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. See Order in re: Motion for a temporary injunction
and/or a temporary restraining order, Minnesota Judicial Branch, Nov. 8, 2008,
available at
http://www.mncourts.gov/default.aspx?page=NewsltemDisplay&item-43582&printFrien
dly-true.
118 Coleman's team called a press conference at which it expressed concerns about a
later debunked report that the absentee ballots had been riding around in an election
official's trunk, suggesting a real possibility of tampering. Weiner, supra note 62, at 29.
Despite the election official in question confirming that the story was untrue, the story
refused to die; (See David Brauer, Minnesota Election Director Speaks: "Ballots in My
Car" Story False, MINNPOST.COM, Nov. 12, 2008,
http://www.minnpost.com/davidbrauer/2008/11/12/4565/minneapolis election-director-s
peaksballots_inmycar storyfalse). See also Paul Schmeltzer, Fox, with Pawlenty's
Help, Continues Spreading Car-Ballot Fiction, THE MINNESOTA INDEPENDENT, Nov.13,
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[the parties' attorneys]," Weiner writes, "the foundations were laid for what
was to come."1 19
Could mediator(s) perhaps appointed at the start of the recount process,
have resolved this dispute more effectively? This question can be answered
affirmatively in a number of respects. First, the substance of this dispute
could have been addressed more directly. In the litigation context, the
question of jurisdiction was outcome-determinative, even though irrelevant
to whether or not the votes should be counted and under what standard.
Judge Gearin refused to issue the restraining order, not based on the merits of
the claim, but on the grounds that she lacked jurisdiction to do so. A failure
to receive a decision on the merits, not to mention developing standards to
fill in the statutory gaps that would govern future similar disputes, further
fueled the flames rather than contained them. 120 With the assistance of
skilled mediator(s) the parties might have been able to develop a set of
standards for identifying, verifying, and counting neglected or overlooked
ballots early on. Doing so may have precluded or at least reduced in scope
what turned into a battle that took eight months and cost millions in legal
fees.
Second, mediation might have reduced nastiness. A mediated agreement
establishing mutual interest in a fair process could have been a feather in the
cap of both sides (and in our system of Democracy more generally). Instead,
the public experienced yet another dose of aggressive lawyering and
candidate posturing.
Third, as a related point, the parties might have been better able to
manage the press to prevent misinformation-here, confusion about the
existence and location of the missing ballots ensued.121 Without sacrificing
key elements of transparency (i.e., that the mediation happened, what the
arguments were on both sides, how the parties resolved the dispute) the two
sides might have been able to agree on a mutually beneficial set of terms by
which to interface with the media. It would be naYve to think that each side
2008, available at http://minnesotaindependent.com/17385/recount-hannity-pawlenty-
car-ballot-lie.
119 Weiner, supra note 53, at 30.
120 Note that Secretary Mark Ritchie doubts whether the Franken camp wanted a
decision on the merits at all, but rather used the incident as part of its press strategy.
Interview with Secretary Mark Ritchie, Secretary of State, Minn. Office of the Sec. of
State (May 25, 2011).
121 I bore direct witness to the power of misinformation. I was sitting in at a garage
getting my car fixed in Williamsburg, VA reading Weincr's book when a man in the
waiting room said, "Yeah, I remember the Minnesota recount-that's the one where all
those ballots got stashed in some lady's trunk."
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would give up the ability to alert the press as it saw strategically fit in a
recount process. Filing suit plays an important signaling function that
campaigns well recognize. 122 But it could well be that a mediated agreement
might have included language limiting efforts to manipulate the press had
each side seen enough benefit in stemming the damage the other side might
unleash in doing so. 123
And finally, rather than rushing to judges strategically in jurisdictions
throughout the state (as many state election statutes require), one skilled
mediator in charge of helping to resolve all process disputes could provide
consistency and moral authority to push the parties towards swift resolution
of their differences. The scattered nature of resolving post-election disputes
was problem enough for the relatively centralized election administration in
Minnesota. But the problem is exacerbated in states that lack a centralized
process for resolving recount process disputes. A recent example of this
decentralization is the 2011 Wisconsin State Supreme Court recount. The
Wisconsin Government Accountability Board oversees recounts generally,124
but unlike Minnesota, where the Recount Plan1 25 delineated how the process
would unfold in the counties, process decisions not settled by statute in
Wisconsin are made in each individual county.126 Mediated process disputes
could assist in states where election administration is decentralized.
Mediators could function as statewide process experts to help counties
manage process disputes efficiently and uniformly.127
122 As Secretary Mark Ritchie describes, "You always get in the newspaper when
you go to court. Sometimes candidates in a recount file suit with no intention of finding a
solution. It's a means of signaling." Interview with Secretary Mark Ritchie, Secretary of
State, Minn. Office of the Sec. of State (May 25, 2011).
123 For an interesting discussion of the role of the media in public disputes, see
Linda L. Putnam, The Media as a Stakeholder in Framing Public Conflicts, 13 No. 4
Disp. Resol. Mag. 12, 12 (2007).
124 Id.
125 See infra Part VI.B.
126 See supra note 86 (the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board website
confirms this characterization by noting that "Wisconsin has the most decentralized
election administration in the United States."). The site goes on to note that Wisconsin
state law gives each county's Board of Canvassers the primary authority to conduct
recounts, and to decide which ballots should and should not be counted. See Statewide
Supreme Court Recount Update, Gov. Accountability Board, May 6, 2011, 531 U.S. 98
(2000), http://gab.wi.gov/node/1849.
127 The problem of decentralized state election administration was driven home, of
course, in Bush v. Gore. Since Bush v. Gore, many have argued for centralized state
election administration to remedy this problem. See, e.g., Note, Toward a Greater State
Role in Election Administration, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2314 (2005) (includes a
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B. The Role of the Secretary of State's Office
The centralized nature of Minnesota's election regime is personified in
the secretary of state, who is designated the state's chief election officer.128
Secretary Mark Ritchie's role in managing the 2008 recount nicely illustrates
a potential place for mediation in post-election disputes. In Minnesota, the
secretary of state (an elected position) plays a key role in managing elections
in general and recounts and contests in particular. 129 The Office of Elections
is housed within the Office of the Secretary of State (OSS). In Minnesota, the
secretary of state serves as one of five members of the state Canvassing
Board. 130 During the early days of the 2008 senate recount, Minnesota
secretary of state mediated process disputes between the campaigns (and
other interested parties) to establish the recount process. While there are
several important ways in which this process differed from a typical
mediation, the similarities are instructive.
An early example of Ritchie's mediator-like role came just after Election
Day when the need for a recount became apparent. Secretary Ritchie reached
comprehensive view of state modes of election administration and argues for centralized
administration to ease efficiency and reduce partisanship); Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson,
One Person, One Vote: Protecting Access to the Franchise Through the Effective
Administration of Election Procedures and Protections, 40 URB. LAW. 269, 273 (2008)
(describing the role of secretaries of state as chief election administrators and argues for
centralization).
128 The Minnesota Constitution grants the secretary of state a central role. See MINN.
CONST. art. VII, § 8 ("Election returns to secretary of state; board of canvassers. The
returns of every election for officeholders elected statewide shall be made to the secretary
of state who shall call to his assistance two or more of the judges of the supreme court
and two disinterested judges of the district courts. They shall constitute a board of
canvassers to canvass the returns and declare the result within three days after the
canvass.").
129 See MiN. STAT. §§ 204B.145-46 (redistricting); 204B.27 (election
administration); 204B.47 (giving SoS authority to adopt alternative election procedures to
permit the administration of any election affected by court orders); MINN. R. 8235.0200
(recounts).
130 See MINN. STAT. § 204C.31, subdiv. 2 ("The state canvassing board shall consist
of the secretary of state, two judges of the supreme court and two judges of the district
court selected by the secretary of state. None of the judges shall be a candidate at the
election. If a judge fails to appear at the meeting of the canvassing board, the secretary of
state shall fill the vacancy in membership by selecting another judge who is not a
candidate at the election. Not more than two judges of the supreme court shall serve on
the canvassing board at one time.").
357
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
out to the campaigns to hammer out basic procedural issues. 131 He convened
a conference call with the Director of Elections Gary Poser, an attorney from
the Minnesota Attorney General's Office, and lawyers representing the two
campaigns. According to Poser, the OSS circulated a document to- both
campaigns prior to the call that laid out the basic procedural rules for the
recount (a document in final draft titled the Recount Plan). 132 The draft
Recount Plan drew in part from procedures used in prior Minnesota recounts.
The stated purpose of the call was to review the draft Recount Plan and
answer any process questions or concerns the campaigns might have.
According to Director Poser, right at the start of the call, one of the
campaigns circulated a redlined version of the document indicating its
desired changes. The other side had not had an opportunity to review this
redlined document (nor had Secretary Ritchie, the Director of Elections, or
the AG's office). Secretary Ritchie elected to give participants ten minutes to
read through the redlined changes. According to Poser, the redlining was not
heavy-handed. Many of the comments were small matters such as whether
Coleman should be referred to as "Senator Coleman" or whether Franken
should be referred to as "Mr. Franken."l 33 Although some of the matters
handled on the call were trivial, a few of the issues discussed, namely the
issue of duplicate ballots discussed below, turned out to be quite significant.
How closely did the conference call parallel a mediated process?
Secretary Ritchie, holding himself out as a neutral party, convened the call to
resolve the contours of a set of procedural issues he knew would be
contentious between two parties passionately opposed. The call was intended
to educate the parties about the draft Recount Plan, and also to try and work
out any differences in advance to avoid disputes down the road. The call was
in many ways a delicate mediated dance. As Secretary Ritchie described it,
"we wanted to settle on process solutions that would create a balance of
administrability, fairness, and agreement from the campaigns. We knew if
either campaign was sufficiently dissatisfied with the result, we would end
up in court."134
131 Weiner, supra note 62, at 58 ("[a]fter a series of meetings and conference calls
between both campaigns and Ritchie's office, sixteen ground rules were established for
the recount.").
132 The third-party candidate, Dean Barkley, was invited to participate on the call
but chose not to. Telephone Interview with Gary Poser, Dir. of Elections, State of Minn.
(May 26, 2011).
133 Ultimately the document refers to the candidates by their last name only. A copy
of the final Recount Plan available at http://www.sos.state.mn.us/index.aspx?page=1405.
134 Interview with Sec'y Ritchie, supra note 120.
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Secretary Ritchie understood the need to facilitate party agreement on
issues of concern, in large part to enhance efficiency by avoiding court
battles. Secretary Ritchie's office knew it could not heavy-handedly dictate
the terms of the Recount Plan. Instead, Ritchie undertook to listen to
concerns the parties raised on the call, seek out authority where possible on
those issues from the AG representative, generate options to resolve those
disputes, and create a final document reflecting agreement reached.
Ultimately, the call produced the final Recount Plan that reflected the
concerns and interests raised.' 3 5
Importantly, the conference call featured several characteristics not
typical of mediation. First, the campaigns lacked the ability to define the
terms of agreement. They could ask questions and make suggestions, but in
the end the OSS, working with the AG's office, had the authority to dictate
the Plan. Secretary Ritchie could take input and suggestions from the
campaigns and rely on legal authority of the AG's office, but ultimately
retained control over the document.136
A second way that the call differed was the players involved. In most
mediations, the parties and/or their attorneys meet privately with the
mediator(s). So long as the parties have authority to settle, most mediators do
not want others in the room.137 In certain kinds of mediations, particularly of
public disputes, mediators realize the importance of having a full set of
interests represented at the table and will refrain from mediating until all
interested parties are present.138
1 According to Director Poser, the Recount Plan that the Secretary of State's
Office submitted to the Canvassing Board represented changes and amendments
produced as a result of campaign input during the call. Telephone Interview with Gary
Poser, supra note 131; Recount Plan, supra note 133.
136 The State Canvassing Board, which signed off on the document as submitted,
retained final authority over the document, but theoretically could have made changes to
it. Telephone Interview with Gary Poser, supra note 132.
' 137 Note that some mediators prefer to mediate without lawyers in the room in
deference to party autonomy and self-determination, and because lawyers often find the
problem-solving orientation difficult. In at least two states, mistrust of lawyers in the
mediation setting has culminated in statutes giving mediators the power to exclude
lawyers from mediation sessions. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3182(a) (2009); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 23-603(a)(6) (1985). For a thoughtful discussion on the benefits and drawbacks of
lawyer representation in mediation, see Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers' Representation of
Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a
Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 269, 275-331 (1999).
139 Most mediators and court-mandated mediation programs require the presence of
individuals on both sides with the authority to settle. In court-ordered mediation,
accusations of bad-faith mediation can stem from failure of a party to send an individual
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A third way the conference call differed from mediation was Secretary
Ritchie's reliance on authoritative input. When the campaigns raised
concerns, Secretary Ritchie would often ask the AG's counsel to provide an
assessment of what the law dictated on the subject at issue. Likewise,
election administrators on the call also served an "expert" function. The
campaigns' assertions for certain changes to the process could have huge
implications for, for example, election official staffing demands. The voice
of election administrators in defining this process was therefore critical. In
some instances, particularly in the collaborative mediation model, 139
mediators rely on participating experts. But for the most part, traditional
mediation excludes such input.
A fourth way the conference call differed from traditional mediation was
the role of the public interest. A controversial question in mediation circles is
whether or not mediators should take the public interest into account when
mediating.140 Many believe that mediators, particularly those mediating large
public policy disputes, must keep the public interest in mind even when those
interests are not necessarily represented at the table. Arguably, Secretary
Ritchie performed this role on the call. Secretary Ritchie understood that an
important component of the process was integrity of the system and public
confidence.141 With this understanding at the fore, he describes one of his
to mediation with authority to settle. For a review of cases in which inadequate authority
resulted in findings of bad faith, see Roger L. Carter, Oh, Ye of Little [Good] Faith:
Questions, Concerns and Commentary on Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in
Mediations, 2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 367, 385 (2002).
139 That said, it should be noted that in a relatively new form of ADR called
collaborative law, collaborative practitioners commonly bring in outside experts to assist
parties in crafting their agreement. See PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW:
ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION 111-14 (2d. 2008).
140 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Professional Responsibility for Third-Party Neutrals,
11 ALTERNATIVES To HIGH COST LITIG. 129, 131 (1993) (asking whether, "mediators of
large public-policy disputes have any obligation to the public if there is no obvious
representation of public interests in a particular dispute?); see also Carol Izumi, Implicit
Bias and the Illusion of Mediator Neutrality, 34 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 71, 82-83 (2010)
("For years, scholars and practitioners have questioned whether a mediator should be a
mere facilitator of party-initiated outcomes or should assertively prevent agreements that
are unfair or favor more powerful parties.").
141 Jocelyn Benson, in a fascinating book about the role of secretaries of state,
describes the various hats secretaries of state wear with regard to managing elections. In a
chapter entitled, "The Secretary as Voter Advocate," Benson outlines the various ways
secretaries of state advocate for the public interest: "[V]oters and sitting Secretaries must
form a partnership of collaboration and communication. In doing so, voters are able to
inform and bolster a Secretary's ability to voice their concerns and advocate on their
behalf." Most of the efforts she describes include election administration reform efforts,
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main functions on the call as representing those interests. 142 The question of
whether a secretary of state can adequately represent the public interest in a
mediation setting raises a slew of interesting questions. First, if the secretary
of state is an elected official, does this make him or her more or less
responsive to the public interest? The answer is not clear. Some scholars
have posited that legislatures are a better forum for election disputes because
turning to a majoritarian institution resolving election disputes is better than
asking the judicial branch to decide (i.e., a political forum for a political
question).143 This may arguably be true of an elected secretary of state as
well-she or he may be quite responsive to the interests of the electorate, as
many believe was the case with Secretary Ritchie.144 At the same time,
examples of highly politicized secretaries of state abound-one need look no
further than Katherine Harris during Bush v. Gore.145 It is not at all clear that
a state's chief election officer can be trusted to represent the public interest
across the political spectrum.
In the context of post-election litigation, the question of public voice can
be a practical one. In the Franken-Coleman recount, the campaigns each
mounted efforts to inject individual voters into the process. During the early
phases of the recount, the Franken team methodically gathered data about
and affidavits from voters who claimed their votes had been rejected for
unclear reasons. 146 Later at trial, a lawyer for Franken, Charlie Nauen, was
permitted to intervene on behalf of sixty-one voters whose ballots had been
rejected.147 For its part, the Coleman team organized an ill-fated class-action
get-out-the-vote programs, and so forth. Benson notes that partisan politics often frustrate
secretaries of states' efforts to advocate for voters. JOCELYN F. BENSON, STATE
SECRETARIES OF STATE: GUARDIANS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 65 (2010).
142 Interview with Sec'y Ritchie, supra note 120.
143 See Huefner, supra note 24, at 321.
144 Weiner, supra note 62, at 121. Note that Secretary Ritchie indicated that the next
election loomed large for him during the recount as he made an effort to do his best by
the people of Minnesota. Interview the Sec'y Ritchie, supra note 120.
145 Daniel P. Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform: From Rules to Institutions, 28
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 125, 127 (2009).
146 Weiner, supra note 62, at 91.
147 Weiner, supra note 62, at 173. See Petitioners' Memorandum of Law in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment, Peterson v. Ritchie, Minn. Dist. Ct., Jan. 21, 2009,
No. A09-65, available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edulelectionlaw/litigation/documents/MNElectionContest-
PetersonMemo-1-21-08.pdf (petition on behalf of the 64 voters); Order, Peterson v.
Ritchie, Minn. Dist. Ct., Jan. 16, 2009, No. A09-65, available at
http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public/Other/2008%20Elections/Order.1.1 6 .09 .p
361
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
effort so that the interests of 11,000 aggrieved voters in the state would be
represented in the litigation. 148 Despite the effort of the campaigns to
incorporate the public interest into their narratives, it remained a partisan
effort to do so; the problem of representation of the public's interest therefore
persists.
The problem of the public interest brings to light one of the most difficult
issues in mediating public disputes: should the parties be able to define the
contours of agreement if such agreement fails to take into account the public
interest? An issue raised on Secretary Ritchie's conference call is illustrative
of this point.
C. Party Agreement and the Problem ofDuplicate Ballots
One of the biggest sticking points on the call concerned duplicates. When
absentee ballots arrived torn or otherwise mutilated through the postal
service, standard election administration practice guided that election
officials would make a new ballot that could be fed into the tabulating
machines. Original ballots were marked Original and set aside; duplicated
ballots were marked Duplicate and also saved. The original Recount Plan
stipulated that election officers administering the recount should count the
duplicate ballots. But the redlined document took issue with this plan,
advocating instead that original ballots be used in the count (on the theory
df (order making the 64-person suit part of the pending litigation between Al Franken and
Norm Coleman in Ramsey County).
148 Weiner, supra note 62, at 173. Order Denying Motion for Certification of a Class
Peterson v. Ritchie Minn. Dist. Ct., Feb. 23, 2009, No. A09-65, available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/Orderdenyingcertificationofac
ass.pdf (denying Coleman's campaign class certification to 11,000 absentee voters). The
following are the grounds on which the court denied the class action certification: (a.)
MINN. STAT. § 204B.44, which governs the process of seeking a remedy to an error,
omission, or wrongful act in the election process, refers to "any individual;" it does not
contemplate a class-action suit; (b.) MINN. STAT. § 204B.44 gives Minnesota Supreme
Court original jurisdiction over such cases. In this case, Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure would not govern (as would apply to a district court), but rather Minnesota
Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure would apply to the Supreme Court. There is no
mechanism for class certification under Minn. R. of Civ. App. Pro.; (c.) If Rule 23 of
Minn. R. of Civ. Pro. did apply, Coleman's petition would nevertheless not qualify for
class certification on the basis that it lacked commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation-all requirements under Rule 23. Id. at 4, 6-7. First, the court found that
Coleman's petition lacked commonality in that although members of the class shared a
"common question of law," there were "unique questions of fact." Id. at 6. In addition,
the class lacked typicality and adequacy of representation in that "Coleman cannot
represent the class of absentee voters.. .because he is not a member of that class." Id. at 7.
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that voter intent would less likely be lost using the original ballot). When the
opposing campaign agreed with this change, the Secretary of State's Office
consented to what seemed a reasonable agreement among the parties. The
final document therefore indicated the agreed upon process:
As the Table Official sorts the ballots, he or she shall remove all ballots that
are marked as duplicate ballots and place those duplicate ballots in a fourth
pile. At the conclusion of the sorting process, the Table Official shall open
the envelope of original ballots for which duplicates were made for that
precinct and sort the original ballots in the same manner as they sorted all
other ballots. 149
Although the parties readily agreed to this revision on the call (without
objection at the time from other participants, including the Secretary of
State's Office), those administering the recount came to rue the decision. As
election officials put this process into place, a terrible problem became
apparent: the number of ballots marked duplicate and original did not always
match up.150
This story demonstrates a problem inherent in letting parties agree to
process rules in an election mediation.' 51 Parties in an election mediation
may agree on processes that create huge headaches for recount
administrators, are unworkable, or worse, come at the expense of the public
interest. What if it is problematic to allow parties too much control in
election mediation? This very tension-when and whether to let parties agree
to process decisions-became one of the most controversial issues in the
2008 Minnesota recount as the next section relates.
D. Judicial Deference to the Parties: The December 18 Order
On December 18, 2008, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued a
surprising and contentious opinion accompanied by two vigorous dissents. 152
The order read, inter alia, as follows:
149 Recount Plan, supra note 133.
150 Weiner, supra note 62.
151 Note the interesting overlap between the parties' ability to agree on process
issues in mediation and recent holdings about the ability of parties to negotiate for dispute
resolution processes in arbitration clauses. In Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S.
576 (2008), the Supreme Court held that parties cannot agree in an arbitration clause to
confer jurisdiction on a federal court to apply an expanded scope of review.
152 Coleman v. Ritchie, 758 N.W.2d 306 (Minn. 2008) (Norm Coleman, a candidate
in a disputed election, petitioned the court seeking to prevent county canvassing boards
from counting rejected absentee ballots in the pending administrative recount).
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Because previously rejected absentee ballots that all agree were rejected
improperly should be counted, and in light of the fact that the State
Canvassing Board has not yet certified the final results of the recount, we
order candidates Norm Coleman and Al Franken and their campaign
representative, the Secretary of State, and all county auditors and
canvassing boards to establish and implement a process, as expeditiously as
practicable, for the purpose of identifying all absentee ballot envelopes that
the local election officials and the candidates agree were rejected in
error.153
As Jay Weiner sums up the order, "if both campaigns . . . agreed on the
legality of an absentee ballot, it should be counted. If there's not agreement,
that voter is screwed."l 54
The dissenting justices, Justice Alan Page and Justice Paul Anderson,
were nothing short of enraged. Justice Page began his dissent quoting Stalin,
who allegedly said, "I consider it completely unimportant who . .. will vote
or how; but what is extraordinarily important is this-who will count the
votes, and how."155 The dissenters argued that the majority had essentially
abdicated the public interest to an extrajudicial process.
At first blush, it may seem appropriate to let the political process-i.e.,
the battle between the campaigns-play out. We might feel comfortable
deferring to the parties to duke it out, based on the assumption that at least
one of the campaigns (the one that believes a particular voter intended to vote
for its candidate) will be a vigorous advocate for the validity of that voter's
ballot. But the interesting twist in this instance is that the majority did not
leave it to the parties to battle it out with the best advocate winning; it asked
them only to "agree" which absentee ballots were valid. Only once
agreement was reached would a ballot count. The majority did not outline
how agreement should be reached. It left the process question entirely in the
hands of the parties.
Wrote Justice Page in his dissent:
The court's order may seek the peaceful way out by asking the campaigns to
agree on improperly rejected ballots. But the order does not guarantee that
the candidates and their political parties will agree on any rejected ballot.
Instead, the court's order will arbitrarily disqualify enfranchised voters on
153 Coleman, 758 N.W.2d at 308 (emphasis added).
154 Weiner, supra note 62, at 123.
155 Id.
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the whim of the candidates and political parties without the benefit of the
legislatively authorized procedures ... . 156
Justice Page continued,
It is a perverse result, indeed, for political parties and their candidates to
determine whether a voter's absentee ballot was properly or improperly
rejected. By making the acceptance of an improperly rejected ballot
contingent on the candidates' agreement, the court has abdicated its role as
the defender of the fundamental right to vote.157
The dilemma Justice Page identifies engages the problem discussed
above. How can mediation play a role in post-election process dispute
resolution if we are worried about delegating decisions to the parties? 158 Is a
court impermissibly delegating fundamental authority if it allows (or, in this
case requires) the parties to resolve election process disputes? Those
concerned about this abdication may view this as the straw that breaks the
camel's back, invalidating mediation as a viable tool in this context
altogether. But the problems associated with the December 18 order offer a
perfect setting in which to examine whether a mediated solution is in fact a
better alternative, capable of addressing the abdication concern.
Recall the earlier disaggregation of process disputes versus outcome-
determinative disputes. What kind of dispute was at issue in the December 18
order? Clearly, the decision to count or not count a contested absentee ballot
is outcome determinative. But the dispute over the standard by which such
ballots should be identified as valid or invalid is a process dispute to the core.
In the former, a campaign would object to a single absentee ballot being
counted, effectively retaining veto power over the franchise (the path taken).
In the latter, the campaign would be forced to articulate its denial based on an
agreed upon standard (the path not taken). The difference is subtle. But
156 Coleman, 758 N.W.2d at 310 (Page, J., dissenting).
15 7 Id.
158 Interestingly, this concern has been raised in the context of the judiciary
"abdicating" its responsibility to mediators more generally. See Nancy A. Welsh, The
Place of Court-Connected Mediation in a Democratic Justice System, 5 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 117, 135 (2004) (citing Magistrate Wayne Brazil: "mediation ... [has]
democratized the courts 'in potentially profound ways because mediation permit[s], in
fact actively encourage[s], the parties to decide for themselves which values were most
important to them, then to use ADR to pursue those values."'). Prof. Welsh goes on to
identify instances in which this delegation is problematic, ultimately arguing that court-
connected mediation can only be effective and responsible if meaningful accountability
mechanisms are put into place. Id. at 136-42.
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looking at the words the majority order actually used, it is possible that
recognition of this subtlety was the impulse, but was lost in translation. The
order asked the parties to "to establish and implement a process . . . for the
purpose of identifying all absentee ballot envelopes that the local election
officials and the candidates agree were rejected in error."1 59
Perhaps the majority neglected to appreciate-but the dissents picked up
on-the difference between counting only those ballots that the campaigns
could agree on (engaging the outcome-determinative dispute that amounted
to a single party veto) versus requiring the parties to agree on a process to
determine valid ballots (calling for resolution of a process dispute). The
outcome-determinative path is irksome because one side can so easily
stonewall for political ends, disenfranchising voters as a strategic ploy.
Justice Page recognized this problem in his dissent, noting that the candidates
had no obligation to agree to any ballots, "whether reasonable or not."160 Had
the majority opinion more clearly directed resolution of the process
dispute-that the parties should agree upon a standard process to be applied
uniformly to- identify valid versus invalid absentee ballots, the court's
delegation might have been less troubling. In the end, what is worrisome is
not the delegation of the decision to the parties, but the delegation of the
outcome-determinative decision.
Would a mediation of the process dispute at issue in the December 18
order have improved matters? What would that mediated process look like?
Suppose a mediator (or co-mediators) with substantial recount experience
had guided the campaigns in the process of developing standards for
identifying valid ballots. Imagine that the December 18 order had not been a
vague instruction that the parties "agree" before any absentee ballot would be
counted. Imagine instead that the Minnesota Supreme Court had called for a
mediation session between the two parties to develop rules for which ballots
would be counted and which would not in advance of examining any ballots.
The process that unfolded under the "order to agree" involved a clear
mismatch of legal sophistication. The Franken side had sophisticated data
about the likely content of each of the contested ballots, and used this
information to determine which ballots were worth a fight. During the
session to examine contested absentee ballots following the December 18
order, Weiner describes the following phenomenon:
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160 Weiner, supra, note 62, at 126 (quoting Coleman, 758 N.W.2d at 311 (Page, J.,
dissenting)).
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More than once, voting officials and Coleman reps witnessed Franken
lawyers check with staff members-"computer geeks" . . . -who sorted
through voter data information on their laptops. In a few cases, the staffer
with the computer gave a thumbs-down to the Franken lawyer, and a
decision was made. 161
Is this how democracy should function? Should parties be allowed to
choose which votes to fight for, pitting data streams above securing the
fundamental right to have all valid votes count? A mediated scenario could
well have avoided this outcome by ironing out in advance standards defining
process rules for determining which ballots would be deemed valid. Lawyers
might have devised a strategy for identifying which kinds of irregularities
might swing which way, or might adopt a broader tactic of trying to
disqualify as many or as few ballots as possible. But what a mediated
agreement before the fact would accomplish is to avoid the type of overt
partisan ballot "selection" Weiner describes.
There are (at least) two main criticisms of this idea. First, skeptics might
argue that process decisions should not be delegated any more than outcome-
determinative decisions. In response to this criticism, it is not clear that the
Minnesota Supreme Court is in a better position to have articulated the
process standards itself. As the discussion of judicial resolution of process
disputes in the post-election context bears out, judges may not be the best
resource for resolving process disputes.162
A second criticism is that in the instance of the December 18 order, the
time for a discussion of standards had already come and gone. The Franken
campaign was determined that each ballot "told a story," and had settled on a
strategy that refused to lump ballots in cognizable categories.163 This strategy
largely precludes the idea that a mediator could have facilitated a productive
standards discussion at this phase in the Coleman-Franken recount. In the
case of the December 18 order, it was almost certainly too late for a
mediation on process. However, the moral of this tale is not that mediation is
useless in post-election litigation. Rather, it is that had an informed and broad
process mediation taken place far earlier in the game, Minnesotans might
have avoided this dispute devolving to the low of the December 18 Order.
161 Weiner, supra note 62, at 133.
162 See discussion supra.
163 That is, other than the category that a ballot was lawfully cast and wrongfully
rejected-the so-called fifth pile. Telephone interview with Marc Elias, Partner, Perkins
Coie LLP (July 12, 2011) (Elias represented Senator Al Franken in the 2008 recount
proceedings.).
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As these examples from the 2008 Minnesota recount bring to light,
mediation is no panacea for resolving post-election disputes. The problems
go far deeper than the zero-sum nature of elections running at odds with the
promise of ADR-induced value creation. Bifurcation of post-election
disputes into process versus outcome-determinative disputes is likewise
complicated by the problems inherent to delegating process decisions to the
parties in an election dispute. As the 2008 Minnesota recount beautifully
illustrates, even what might seem to be straightforward opportunity for
mediation in a post-election dispute must be approached cautiously and with
full appreciation for the potential dangers of its use. Advocates of mediation
in post-election litigation should not be too full-throated in their call.
Likewise, those who would dismiss mediation in this context should realize
that mediation, when approached in a thoughtful and studied manner by
mediators with experience in the post-election dispute setting, offers the
potential to address some of the many shortcomings of post-election
litigation.
VII. CONCLUSION
The question of ADR's role in public disputes has long been of
interest. 164 ADR scholars and practitioners urge that stubborn adherence to
adversarial processes misses important opportunities for interest-based
consensus building. Could ADR help bridge gaps in healthcare reform? 165
Help find workable consensus on difficult issues like immigration, the
164 See Aric J. Garza, Resolving Public Policy Disputes in Texas Without Litigation:
The Case for Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution by Governmental Entities, 31 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 987, 989 (2000) ("traditional public deliberative processes used to solve
disputes are ripe for the introduction of institutionalized mediation as a tool to facilitate
the remedy of these disputes.").
165 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Scaling Up Deliberative Democracy as Dispute
Resolution in Healthcare Reform: A Work in Progress, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS
(2011), available at www.law.duke.edu/joumals/lcp ("[p]olarization of most political
issues . . . makes gradations and variations of views and policy outcomes impossible to
recognize and discuss because voting and other political procedures ultimately require
binary decisions: yes or no. Although courts must usually come to win or lose binary
solutions, true deliberation before the fact of legislation or regulation could actually
permit more nuanced policy outcomes."). In this article, Menkel-Meadow identifies
theoretical justification from thinkers as diverse as Adam Smith and Amartya Sen for
"the practical 'third party neutral' or skilled deliberative democracy facilitator, mediator,
or moderator." In the words of Adam Smith, an "impartial spectator" who can encourage
"critical scrutiny and public discussion." Id. (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF
MORAL SENTIMENTS (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1976)).
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environment, or education? 66 Given the intractability of so many public
disputes, it seems clear that adversarial, polarized legislative and judicial
processes have certain shortcomings that ADR could usefully address. The
all-too-common instances of Congressional deadlock, such as the debt-
ceiling debacle last summer 67 , underscore the need to re-conceptualize
democratic dispute resolution design and consider whether even the most
intractable public disputes might benefit from ADR's problem-solving
techniques.
Election disputes fit squarely on the list of public disputes for which
current dispute resolution mechanisms fall short. It is most certainly the case
that litigation is best for certain post-election disputes. However, failing to
disaggregate election disputes misses an important opportunity to increase
the efficiency in resolving them. Ambiguities in election procedures and
statutes that give rise to post-election disputes lead to protracted and often
unnecessary litigation in which legal arguments can be (and are) manipulated
to suit an overall strategic purpose instead of the broader public interest of
seeing elections settled fairly, quickly, and with as little involvement of the
court system as possible. This reality suggests a need to explore ADR
methods in the post-election dispute context. With the help of informed and
skilled election mediators, a mediated process could help resolve procedural
and standards gaps early on before malleable legal arguments enter the fray.
Mediation of post-election disputes warrants careful consideration in a world
in which the adversarial process so often disserves democracy.
166 For an interesting (though slightly dated) overview of the role in ADR in
environmental disputes, see Rosemary O'Leary, Tracy Yandle & Tamilyn Moore, The
State of the States in Environmental Dispute Resolution, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
515, 517-610 (1999) (documenting the rise of the use of ADR techniques to resolve
environmental disputes).
167 See L. Michael Hager, Government Gridlock? Try Mediation, THE HILL'S
CONGREss BLOG (Aug. 1, 2011), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/174815-
government-gridlock-try-mediation; David A. Hoffman, Send Mediators to Washington,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Aug. 24, 2011),
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2011/0824/Send-mediators-to-
Washington.
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